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Abstract 
The current structures and draft structures grant the party leaders and the Executive 
undue power over the Parliament in two ways. First, by virtue of constitutional design, the 
Executive and the party leader’s hegemony reduce the Parliament’s capacity to act as a check on 
the Executive. Second, there are contextual factors correlated with political will in using 
available accountability mechanisms which locate beyond the design factors and they have nexus 
with effectiveness of the Parliament. In the other words, the contextual factor such as electoral 
system, party discipline, and party formations impact on the will of the parliament in holding the 
executive accountable. Moreover, despite the existence of some mechanisms to hold the 
government accountable, political accountability is eroding. 
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Introduction: 
The main argument of this thesis is that Parliament’s powers to hold government 
accountable are reduced by design defects in both the draft constitution and the current 
structures; that the parliament’s political will is mitigated by contextual factors; and that the PR-
STV and “Constrained Parliamentary” models could effectively respond to mitigate defects in 
order to allow the Parliament to actively check the executive. 
This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter provides the general 
background for the Kurdistan region, including historical chronologies of the creation of the 
Kurdistan region’s territory, the institutionalizing political process, and the draft constitution. 
The second chapter discusses the accountability concept and its relation to the form of 
government and role of the parliament (legislative body). It also elaborates the design defects 
under both draft constitution and current government structures in relation to political 
accountability concept and its mechanisms. Further, it addresses contextual factors that 
contribute for further exacerbating the power of parliament in holding government into account.   
The third chapter propose a new constitutional design that could respond to the 
accountability crises of the Kurdistan region. In this new design, the issues of  the party 
formations, monopoly of poltical power, party leaders are reduced by PR-STV because PR-STV 
can allow various forms of incentives for party leaders and MPs that could empower the political 
will of parliament in exercising its available tools of accoutablity. In addtion, the constrained 
parlimantarism is helpful desgin in oversghting  the executive’s because it incentivies  the 
poltical actors to discusse the political descions in the parliament’s main chamber in context of 
KR.  
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Chapter I:  
 This chapter provides the background about the formations of Kurdistan region and its 
emerging territories, its institutionalizing political processes, its emerging political opposition, 
and the drafting of the Kurdish constitution. This chapter provides insight into Kurdistan’s 
current constitutional environment. Also, it elucidates the behavior of political actors in directing 
government institutions and clarifies how the parliamentary majority has been used for 
illegitimate ends through different historical phases. 
1.1 The Emergence of the Kurdistan region’s territory as sovereign legal entity: 
This section briefly analyzes the emergence of the Kurdistan region as a recognized 
region inside Iraq through different historical stages.  This section chronologically addresses 
each historical stage of the Kurdistan region inside Iraq when there are revolutionary movements 
demanding the autonomous region or the self-governing territory to include the governorate of 
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil. Hence, this section does not deal with the 
broader definition of the Greater Kurdistan, which claimed full independence during 1918-1943. 
Also, this section does not discuss all revolutionary movements after 1943, but only those 
revolutions that were able to compel the Iraqi government to generate legal guarantees with 
respect to the Kurdish territory.  
During the Iraqi monarchy, Kurdish dissent enabled large-scale control of the Kurdish 
territories in 1944.
1
 The uprising obliged the Prime Minister to negotiate with the Kurdish 
leadership. The Kurdish leadership demanded the autonomous region including Kirkuk, 
                                                 
1 SUZAN IBRAHIM HAJI AMEN, AL-TAJREBA DEMOQRTIA FI KURDISTAN AL-IRAQ [THE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN 
IRAQI KURDISTAN], 26(2011) (AR.). 
 3 
 
Khanaqin, Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil.
2
 This uprising is considered a clear intent of the Kurds 
to establish autonomous territory within Iraq borders. The Kurdish leaderships also demanded 
the power-sharing administrations with the Iraqi government by having a Kurdish deputy for 
each minister, recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language of Iraq, and launching 
economic reform in the Kurds’ area. All these conditions were part of the cease-fire agreement.3 
After these negotiations, the Iraqi government concluded the cease-fire agreement with the 
Kurdish leadership. They agreed that all areas, which are controlled by the Kurdish forces, shall 
be managed under Kurdish administration. They also agreed to allow Kurds to have autonomy in 
the field of the education and culture.
4
 Further, all weapons and military hardware, which were 
seized by Kurds, were to remain in Kurds’ possession.5 In 1945, the Iraqi government 
nevertheless began seizing political activists and initiated military campaigns towards the 
Kurdish leadership's headquarter. Thus, these actions ignited hostilities between Kurdish forces 
and Iraqi army.
6
 The Iraqi government, by virtue of its actions, revoked the cease-fire agreement 
and its promises.
7
 
In 1970, the Kurdish leadership reached a peace agreement with the Iraqi government and 
its representing Ba’ath party.8 This peace agreement, titled the “March 11 Manifesto” of 1970, 9 
established the self-governing areas for the Kurds in the north of Iraq.
10
 Both the central 
government and the Kurdish leadership agreed that the boundaries of the self-governing areas 
                                                 
2 Id at 27. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id at 27-28. 
7 Id. 
8 Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 114, 116-117(1991). 
9 Sherko Kirmanj, Kurdistan Region: A Country Profile, 9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 145, 147(2013). 
10 Malanczuk, supra note 8, at 116. 
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should be based on the result of the census.
11
 However, the central government, soon after 
ratifying the peace agreement, initiated Arabization campaign against the Kurdish areas by 
banishing the Kurdish settlers and substituting them with Arab settlers.
12
   
 On March 11, 1974, the Iraqi central government, which was represented by the 
revolutionary command council and controlled by the Ba’ath party, 13 unilaterally transformed 
this peace agreement into two legal documents. The Ba’ath party implemented this 
transformation in primarily two ways.  First, the revolutionary command council amended the 
interim Constitution of 1970 by stipulating that the majority Kurdish-populated areas “shall 
enjoy autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the law.” 14  Second, it enacted the 
autonomy law of 1974 on the same day.
15
 The validity of these substantive and procedural 
changes to the Kurdish autonomy law were questionable.  
  In term of the substance, the autonomy law insisted on self-governing areas for the 
Kurds, but the autonomy law authorized a very limited independence for the councils of the 
Kurdish self-governing areas. 
16
 For instance, the autonomy law enabled the Kurds to elect a 
legislative council in the Kurdish- populated areas,
17
 but the President of Iraq had the 
                                                 
11 Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 147. 
12 Id. 
13 See Article 37, Al-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970 (“ The Revolutionary 
Command Council is the supreme institution in the State, which on 17 July 1968, assumed the responsibility to 
realize the public will of the people, by removing the authority from the reactionary, individual, and corruptive 
regime, and returning it to the people.”). 
14 See Resolution Amendment 247, Al-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970.( “In 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph B, Article 63 of the Interim Constitution, The Revolutionary Command 
Council have decided, in the Name of the People, in its session convened on 11 March, 1974, to amend the Interim 
Constitution promulgated on 16 July, 1970 as follows :-  
Article 1: The following paragraph shall be added to Article 8, section C: The region, whose majority of population 
is from Kurds, shall enjoy Autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the Law.”). 
15 Id. 
16 Natasha Carver, Is Iraq/Kurdistan a State such that it can be Said to Operate State Systems and thereby Offer 
Protection to its ‘Citizens’?, 14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 57, 66(2002).  
17 Article 10, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974 (Iraq) (“The Legislative Council is the legislative body elected in the 
Region; its formation, organization and procedure shall be defined by a Law.”). 
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discretionary power to appoint a president of the Executive Council—who would be empowered 
to enforce the ordinance of the Legislative Council.
18
 Additionally, the President of Iraq could 
dissolve the executive council of the Kurdish self-governing areas.
19
 Further, the Legislative 
Local Council was confined to issuing ordinances and was prohibited from passing any statute.
20
 
In addition to the Legislative Council’s limited capacity, its ordinances could be reviewed by the 
judicial branch of the central government.
21
 The president of Iraq had the right to dissolve the 
Legislative Council, which was elected by Kurdish voters, if the legislative council dissented to 
the judicial review by the central government.
22
 The content of this law furnished intentional 
legal gaps, creating a political structure in favor of the Ba’ath regime. As a result, the final 
decisions of those councils and their competencies were ultimately controlled by the central 
government.  
In procedural terms, the autonomy law did not afford public participation for the Kurdish 
voters because the Iraqi government unilaterally enacted law without affording Kurdish  review 
or discussion of those laws.  However,  the Ba’ath regime did permit Kurdish leadership to either 
accept the law or to refuse it within fifteen days of each law’s promulgation.23      
                                                 
18 Article 13, Section C, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The President of the Republic entrusts one of the 
members of the Legislative Council to preside over and formulate the Executive Council.”). 
19 Article 13, Section F, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) ( “ The President of the Republic is entitled to 
release the President of the Executive Council from his post, and in this case the Council shall be deemed as 
dissolved.”). 
20 Article 12, Section A, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“ Adopt legislative resolutions necessary for 
developing the Region and promoting its social, cultural, reconstructional and economic utilities of the local nature 
within the limits of the general policy of the State.”). 
21 Article 12, Section B, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The Minister of Justice, or the Minister of State, is 
entitled to discredit the re- solutions of the Autonomy's Bodies before the Observation Body cited in the previous 
paragraph, for their contradiction to the Constitution or laws or regulations within thirty days as from the date of 
notifying the Minister of State.”).  
22 Article 20, Section A, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The President of the Republic is entitled to 
dissolve the Legislative Council …. [I]n case of its non-abiding by the decisions of the Observation Body stipulated 
in Article (19) of this Law.”). 
23 Sarah E Whitesell, The Kurdish Crisis: An International Incident Study, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 455,460 
(1992). 
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Moreover, the outcome of the autonomy law revealed that Iraqi government tried to buy 
time to consolidate its power over the Kurdish revolution. The Iraqi government’s actions were 
considered more of a tactical policy that did not truly recognize the Kurdish autonomy inside 
Iraq.
24
 For instance, in drawing boundaries of the Kurdistan self-governing areas, the Iraqi 
government deprived the Kurds from their oil-rich territories including Khanaqin and Kirkuk in 
addition to some strategic areas such as Akra and Sinjar.
25
 As a result of all these deprivations, 
the Kurdish leadership refused the autonomy law of 1974.
26
  The peace agreement was revoked, 
and the revolution started again.
27
  
 Since February of 1991, the Kurdish territories have received international protection 
mandates.  During the Gulf war, President George H.W Bush exhorted the Iraqi people to 
overthrow their oppressors and to rebel against Saddam Hussein's regime. The United States, 
however, did not intervene in Baghdad by sending troops to topple Hussein’s regime.28 At the 
same time, the Shiite population began an uprising in the south of Iraq and the Kurds revolted in 
north of Iraq. Hence, Hussein’s regime seized the opportunity that US did not send troops and 
rearranged its army and suppressed both Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north. In 
suppressing the north, the Iraqi army committed atrocities, pushing Kurds to flee to the borders 
of Iran and Turkey. Turkey did not allow Kurd refugees to enter its border, but Iran allowed 
Kurds to settle in refugee camps inside Iran’s territories. 29 
                                                 
24 Ofra Bengio, Autonomy in Kurdistan in historical Perspective, In THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ 173, 175 
(Brendan O'Leary et al.,eds., 2006). 
25 Alexander Dawoody, The Kurdish quest for autonomy and Iraq's statehood, 41 JOURNAL OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN 
STUDIES 483, 487(2006); see aslo Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 147. 
26 Whitesell, supra note 23, at 461. 
27 Id at 461-462. 
28 Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 513, 519(2009). 
29 Id at 519-520. 
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Hussein’s atrocities against the Kurds pushed the UN Security Council to demand 
stopping repression of Kurds and other civilians in resolution 688, which stated, “a massive flow 
of refugees towards and across international frontiers . . . threaten[s] international peace and 
security."
30
 The language of the resolution demanded the international community to act in 
stopping the repression of Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south.
31
 In responding to 
resolution 688, the United States, with its allies (Britain and France), imposed a no-fly zone over 
the north from 36th parallel to north Iraq and 32nd parallel to south Iraq.
32
  
Furhter, the no-fly zone was legally justified through  the resolution 686 and 687 because 
they addressed the issue of ceasing fire by stipulating that Iraqi government should " [c]ease 
hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States, including missile attacks 
and flights of combat aircraft."
33
 Implicitly, the language of cease-fire agreement of Resolution 
686 held that as long as the US and its allies flew over the Iraq airspace, the Iraqi combat aircraft 
could not enter the area between the 36
th
 and 32
nd
 paralells. Also, the Resolution permitted the 
U.S. and its allies to fly over the zones to protect civilians and ensure that the Iraqi government 
was acting within its provision to stop hostility.
34
After the U.S. and its allies instituted the no-fly 
zone for the Kurds, the Iraqi government withdrew from most Kurdish areas in the north of 
Iraq.
35
 Henceforth, the Iraqi government unilaterally defined the Kurdistan region boundaries by 
its withdrawing, and began demarcating the boundaries with its military checkpoints to include 
                                                 
30 Timothy P Mcilmail, No – Fly Zones : The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion Regimes Over Bosnia 
and Iraq, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 40-50 (1994). 
31 Id. 
32 Id at 52. 
33 Id at 53. 
34 Id. 
35 IMAD M MIRZA, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHERN KURDISTAN: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS FOR 
DEMOCRACY 18 (2007). 
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three governorates (Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil) as it was defined in the autonomy law of 
1970.
36
   
After the invasion of Iraq, Kurds actively participated in the process of rebuilding Iraq. 
They were able to transform the Kurdistan region boundaries from the de-facto territory, which 
is unilaterally demarcated by Iraqi regime, to be fully recognized legal territory through 
(Transitional Administrative Law).
 37
  TAL explicitly recognized the Kurdistan region borders, 
stating “[t]he Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of the 
territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of 
Dohuk, Erbil, Sulimanyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh. TAL also stated, “[t]he term ‘Kurdistan 
Regional Government’ shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of 
Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region.”38   Furthermore, TAL 
recognized the demographic changing of these areas by Hussein’s Regime.39 Consequently, TAL 
provided a mechanism for resolving these disputed areas, which ultimately could be the parts of 
                                                 
36
 CHARLES G MACDONALD & CAROLE A O'LEARY, KURDISH IDENTITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL STATUS, 
150 (2007)  
37 Kenneth Katzman, Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, 2-3 (DIANE Publishing. 2010).  
38See Article 53, Section A, Transitional Administrative law (2004).  
39See Article 58, Section A, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The Iraqi Transitional Government, and 
especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures 
to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain 
regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration 
in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting 
nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps [.]”). 
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the legal boundaries of Kurdistan region.
40
 Today, the Kirkuk and Khanaqin remain disputed 
territories between the Iraq government and the Kurdistan region.
41
  
Moreover, the Kurdistan region, in the permanent Iraqi constitution of 2005, is 
acknowledged as a legal and federal region within Iraq border. The Iraqi Constitution stated, 
“[t]his Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with 
its existing authorities, as a federal region.”  Further, the 2005 Constitution recognized all current 
boundaries and territories of the Kurdistan region. Nonetheless, Kurdistan’s territories remain in 
dispute. The permanent Constitution of Iraq, by Article 140, preserved recognition of Kirkuk and 
other disputed areas as demographic changed territories by implicating article 58 of TAL.
42
 
Additionally, Article 140 provides mechanisms for resolving these territories by stipulating 
normalization, census, and eventually referendum in these disputed areas.
43
 The Constitution 
called for these mechanisms to be implemented by December 31, 2007.
44
  
In addition, the dilemma of these disputed areas has reflected on the draft of the 
Kurdistan region constitution. The Kurdistan region border even has been identified as two kinds 
                                                 
40 See Article 58, Section B, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The previous regime also manipulated and 
changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government 
shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent 
constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it 
shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the 
Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to 
appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.”). 
41See Article 58, Section C, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The permanent resolution of disputed 
territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census 
has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified This resolution shall be consistent with the 
principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.”). 
42Article 140, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. (“First: The 
executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all 
subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.  Second: The- responsibility placed upon the 
executive branch of the Iraqi  Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional  Administrative 
Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected  in accordance with this Constitution, provided that 
it accomplishes completely ‘normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other 
disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens’, by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.”). 
43 Id. 
44 Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 152. 
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of border. One is the recognized territories under framework  of Iraqi Constitution.  This kind of 
border can be called the “territorial borders.” The territorial borders are described  in the drafted 
Kurdish Constitution as “[t]he Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a geographical historical entity 
consisting of Dohuk governorate with its existing administrative borders, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, 
Erbil, and districts of 'Aqrah, Shaikhan, Sinjar, Talkaif, Qaraqush, and townships of Zamar, 
Ba'asheeqa, and Aski Kalak from Nineveh province, districts of Khanaqin and Mandali from 
Diyala province with its administrative border before 1968.”45 Further, the Iraqi Constitution 
does not specify the “territorial borders” of the Kurdistan region. This lack of specification 
implicitly grants the Kurdistan regional government authority to determine its territorial border 
according to KRG’s demarcation.  
The second kind of Kurdistan region’s border is called “political border.” The meaning of 
the political border implicates the disputed areas of article 140 of Iraqi constitution. The DCKR 
stated “[t]he political borders of the Region shall be determined by the implementation of Article 
140 of the Federal Constitution.”46 The main purpose behind the idea of the political borders is 
that if the Kurdistan region confines itself to actually recognized borders under the Iraqi 
constitution, this confining may imply that the Kurdistan region concedes the disputed areas to 
the  federal government of Iraq because these areas are not be mentioned as Kurdistan region 
borders. For this reason, DCKR intends to preserve its prerogative by creating the political 
borders ideas.  
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Article 2, Section 1, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009. 
46 Article 2, Section 2, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009. 
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1.2 Emerging governmental institutions 
This section focuses on the process of rebuilding government institutions. After the Iraqi 
government had withdrawn its institutions from the No-fly zone, which later was recognized as 
the Kurdistan region, in October1991, 
47
 Kurdistan faced an administration vacuum.
48
  The size 
of this vacuum negatively impacted the economic infrastructure of the Kurdistan region. For 
instance, withdrawing of Iraqi government institutions caused 300,000 civil servants to be out of 
work.
49
 Among the Kurdish region’s population, unemployment was between 70%-90%.50 In 
addition, the Iraqi regime also set the economic blockade on the Kurdistan region despite the fact 
that Iraq itself was under UN trade sanctions. The Kurds lost the 75% of their supplies that came 
from the other parts of Iraq.
51
 The sanction policy was aimed at creating chaos and starvation in 
the Kurdistan region.
52
 Hence, this chaos and starvation could induce the Kurdish leadership to 
demand the Iraqi government to take control of the no-fly zone and ultimately to provide relief to 
the Kurds.
 53 
  
 However, he Kurdish political parties reorganized themselves in one front, which was 
called the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF).
54
 The Kurdish political parties were aware of the 
administration vacuum and began self-governing to deliver basic needs for the citizens.  Hence, 
the IKF, with advice from a committee of Judges and lawyers, drafted and ratified the first law, 
                                                 
47 Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 148. 
48 Id. 
49 Id at 154. 
50 Id. 
51 HANS EIVIND DALSBØ, A CULTURE FOR DEMOCRACY? EMERGENT CIVIL SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN SOUTHERN 
KURDISTAN 39 (2007). 
52 Id. 
53 Mirza, supra note 35, at 18. 
54 Michael M Gunter, The KDP-PUK conflict in northern Iraq, 50 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 224, 226 (1996) 
(IKF was established in 1988. The main purpose of IKF was to overthrow the Ba’ath regime in the power and to 
seek for creating democratic regime in the Iraq and to establish the Iraqi Kurdistan as federal state in inside Iraq). 
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which established the first Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA).
55
  Henceforth, all other 
branches of governments were created by the KNA.  Indeed, the Kurdish region has no 
constitution. Instead, the IKF through seven political leaders enacted the first law to establish the 
Kurdistan National Assembly, 
56
 which, in 2009, was later renamed as the Kurdistan 
Parliament.
57
 Also, the Kurdistan region  voters have not voted  for the Kurdistan National 
Assembly Law, but instead the Kurdish voters have participated to vote for the political parties in 
the election process.  
 Despite of the aforementioned facts, the Kurdistan National Assembly Law (KNAL) is 
the fundamental law that organizes political and governmental structures because KNAL, to 
some degree, furnishes the self-government system in the No-fly zone; and regulates the 
governmental vacuum.
 58
  The KNAL regulated the National Assembly’s first election in May 
1992.
59
 Even though the Kurdistan region did not have a formal census, IKF considered the 
percentage of turnout was 90% of the 1.1 million eligible voters.
60
 
 The KNAL stipulated that the political parties and independent candidates must pass the 
7% threshold to enter the national assembly. 
61
 Due to the threshold, numerous small parties and 
independent candidates failed to gain seats in the National Assembly. The result of the threshold 
was that the PUK won 44.93 % of the votes and KDP won 47.51 % votes.
62
 The result between 
                                                 
55 DENISE NATALI, KURDISH QUASI-STATE: DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY IN POST-GULF WAR IRAQ 33 (2010). 
56 See Dalsbø, supra note 51, at 40 (There are some arguments that point out to the fact that Kurdish leaderships did 
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KDP and PUK was very close, but none of them formed the required majority.
63
  The KDP 
gained 51 seats, and PUK gained 49 seats. The election process had many issues with the validity 
of votes and counting.  
The PUK urged KDP to accept a shared government, threatening resolution by violence 
otherwise., The PUK and KDP agreed to share the government, the national assembly, and the 
judicial branch based on 50-50 split—half of governmental power to KDP and the other half for 
PUK. For instance, if the Minster was PUK, the Deputy of Minster had to be KDP and so forth. 
This “50-50” sharing was reflected even in the primary government levels such us schools, 
hospitals, checkpoints, and police departments. 
64
Also, it is reflected in the law of the council of 
minister. The law of the council of minister provides that if the ministers of one political party, 
which formed the government with the other political party, resigned from the council, the 
council of ministers would be considered dissolved.
65
  
The first Iraqi Kurdistan government, which is called Kurdistan regional government 
(KRG)
66
, formed based on power-sharing in July 1992.
67
 Power-sharing agreement, to some 
degree, was a responsive solution for filling the governmental vacuum of Kurdistan region and 
for keeping unity of Kurdistan from old enmities of PUK and KDP. Nevertheless, the power of 
Kurdistan region’s institution was undermined by those officials who carried order from KDP 
                                                 
63 Mirza, supra note 35, at 19. 
64 Natali, supra note 55, at 32-33. 
65 See Article 11, Section 2, Law of The Council of Ministers No.3 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
66 GARETH R. V. STANSFIELD, IRAQI KURDISTAN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENT DEMOCRACY 125 
(2003) (The Kurdish lawyers, who had been in diaspora, played important role in advising the Kurdish leadership for 
adapting the ruling structure for the region. They advised the political party’s leadership about technical detail about 
how the new national assembly should function, and how the cabinet of minster should be formed). 
67 Michael M Gunter, supra note 54, at 226. 
 14 
 
and PUK’s politburo. For instance, Barzani and Talabani did not hold any governmental position 
inside KRG, but they were substantial descion-maker to direct the agenda of the government.
68
  
The power-sharing process created the partisanship government from a basic level of 
government to a higher level of government.
69
  The KRG was constrained to propose the policy 
or implanting program to PUK and KDP’s politburo. After approving by politburos, the KRG 
could move forward to exercise its executive powers. Technically, the politburo played role of 
both National Assembly and Council of Minister because the actual and efficient political 
deliberation and discussion were taken place in politburos instead of the National Assembly or 
Council of Ministries.  KRG was a rubber stamp to fulfill the politburos’ orders. 70  Similarly, 
dividing the council of ministries between PUK and KDP caused the creation of mutual veto 
between the ministers and their deputies.
71
 In this way, the power of the minister was equal to the 
power of his or her deputy. Consequently, executing governmental duties required approval by 
both of them.
72
 Mutual veto generated heavy burdens of executing governmental tasks and its 
efficiency.
73
 
At the beginning of 1992, leadership was the major dispute between PUK and KDP 
because both Talabani and Barzani highly contested to be the highest power in the hierarchy of 
the executive. In order to be supreme leader and to have power over both the national assembly 
and council of ministries, PUK and KDP passed the law to determine the supreme leader of 
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national liberation movement in August 4, 1992.
74
  In the Theory, the supreme leader’s fixed-
mandate shifted the system from a parliamentary system to a semi-presidential system because 
the president possessed the fixed-mandate with having substantial power, and the survival of 
government depended on the parliament confidence.
75
 The supreme leader had both powers of 
foreign affairs and defense intermingled with prime minister’s powers, and the broad legislative 
powers intermingled with the national assembly powers.
76
 Consequently, the supreme leader 
would represent the Kurdistan region at internal and international levels, exercising commander 
in chief power, and having veto power on enactments of the national assembly.
77
 Also, the Prime 
Minister was accountable to the supreme leader in fulfilling its duties.
78
  Notably, in the law of 
electing supreme leader of liberation movement did not include any impeachment provision or 
any safeguard against supreme leader’s power. Implicitly, the law immunized the supreme leader 
from any checks by National Assembly or council of ministers. The election of the supreme 
leader was conducted at the same time of the National Assembly election. Neither Barzani nor 
Talabani was able to secure the majority of the voters.
79
 The supreme leader position was empty 
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until 1999, when Talabani unilaterally declared himself as the supreme leader of liberation 
movements.
80
 
Arguably, the KRG’s structures lacked any checks and balances because the 
governmental power was highly concentrated in the politburos since the decision-making process 
was totally outside of the government bodies.
81
  Even the politburo does not have any 
accountability for his members because the structures of these two political parties based on the 
Stalinist political structure characterized by intense hierarchy systems.
82
 The KRG functioned 
depending on the will of PUK and KDP. Hence, there were potentialities of the conflict of 
interest between the politburos, which remained authoritative during two consecutive cabinets. 
1.3 Civil War and the Period of Two Administration 
By the end of 1993, the relation between PUK and KDP had deteriorated due to their 
differences related to revenue sharing and balance of powers in the region. Moreover, the PUK 
and KDP had significant problems co-managing government resources because these political 
parties created their own revenue resources.  These revenues were not deposited into the 
government treasury. For instance, KDP gained 85 percent of its revenue from Kurdish-Turkish 
border through tariff and taxation, which reached 750 million annually. Likewise, PUK 
reestablished Sulimanyah cigarette factory, which produced from 12,000 to 144,000 packs a day 
between 1991 to 1997.
83
 Even some officials of KRG transferred treasury money to the personal 
accounts of politburos.
84
 These corrupt means of revenue collection created “accusation[s] and 
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counter-accusation[s]” between both PUK and KDP.85 Each of them blamed the other side for 
corruption by using public money for the personal benefit.
86
  Meanwhile, PUK and KDP had 
worked to reinforce their territorial base by creating obstacles for the other. 
  The small parties, which could not pass the 7 percent threshold, joined the KDP and 
some others joined the PUK.
87
  The Kurdistan Unity Party with three smaller parties concluded 
an agreement with KDP to become part of KDP political structures. 
88
 This new formation of 
KDP could change the balance of power inside the government. The KDP claimed that the 50-50 
power sharing agreement should be rejected because KDP had more supporters than PUK. 
KDP’s claim was the first signal to PUK that PUK could not be an equal partner to KDP for 
purposes of power-sharing.  This new coalition threatened the future of PUK and its stake in the 
elections of 1995.
89
 
All these factors ignited the civil war in April 1994. At the outset, PUK was able to 
control both Sulimanyah and Erbil. However, the KDP was able to reverse this situation. In 
1996, KDP, with the Iraqi army defeated PUK in Erbil. KDP controlled Dhok and Erbil, which 
become the territory for KDP. It formed its cabinet of ministries because KDP, with five seats of 
minorities, was able to fulfill the majority of Kurdistan National Assembly. The PUK and its 
allies controlled Sulimanyah, which become the territory for the other cabinet of ministries under 
PUK’s leadership. As result, the executive power was divided for two cabinets of ministries, one 
in Erbil and the other one in Sulimanyah, but the judicial branch, especially the Court of 
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Cassation, remained unified until 1999.
90
 Both the PUK and the KDP claimed to be the 
legitimate and official government of Kurdistan region.
91
 The civil war continued from 1994 to 
1998.
92
  
  After series of agreements, both Barzani and Talabani concluded a peace agreement to 
furnish peace in the Kurdistan region on September 17, 1998. The Washington agreement, to 
some degree, provided stability in the region.
93
 The Washington agreement stipulated that PUK 
and KDP agreed to create a provisional government followed by the general election for KNA in 
order to establish a unified government.
94
 The agreement further stipulated that KDP should 
share its revenue with PUK.
95
  Finally, the agreement stipulated that both PUK and KDP should 
cooperate with Turkey to stop the activity of PKK.
96
Nevertheless, KDP argued that the PUK was 
helping PKK implicitly by allowing PKK to use PUK’s territory against KDP. 97  Likewise, PUK 
argued that KDP was creating a pretext to undermine the Washington agreement because KDP 
was not willing to share its revenue. The contesting for leadership was unresolved.  Divisions 
between the PUK and the KDP continued to run deep. In August 1999, the PUK unilaterally 
declared Talabani as Supreme leader of Kurdish liberation movement. Additionally, PUK 
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created a second Court of Cassation in Sulimanyah to review the judgment of the lower court.
98
 
KDP formed its fourth cabinet of the government, including eighteen ministers and five ministers 
of the region, without allowing PUK to participate. From 1994 to 2000, PUK and KDP had 
concluded dozens of agreements, but these agreements were not implemented.
99
  
 1.4 Unification of government and emerging of the presidency position. 
After 11 September 2001, the political scene began changing as both PUK and KDP had 
anticipated the Saddam Hussein would be removed.
100
 They intended to capitalize on the 
Peshmerga forces by showing that they would be essential allies to the US during the invasion of 
Iraq analogous to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. PUK and KDP struggled to not be 
marginalized after the invasion of Iraq. Especially, KDP had more predicaments post-Saddam 
Hussein because KDP was controlling the oil route between Turkey and Baghdad. The regime 
change impacted the revenue that KDP got from the Oil’s route.101Post Saddam, both the KDP 
and PUK demanded a federal system for the Kurdistan region. To some degree, KDP wanted 
more powerful federal region for post-Saddam area to maintain its economic interest in the 
region.
102
The PUK, on the other hand, sought a softer version of federalism for the Kurdistan 
region.
103
 
 Arguably, KDP and PUK noticed that the divided government would reduce their 
bargaining power with the Iraqi government in the post-Saddam Hussein era. By the end of 
2002, PUK's legislators agreed to participate in KNA session. This participation could be 
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considered as the first step for unification of the government by activating the KNA as the one 
legislature for the whole Kurdistan region.
104
  Furthermore, after the invasion of Iraq by United 
States and its Allies, the political scene in Iraq was changing rapidly.  
December 1, 2004, Talabani and Barzani concluded a power-sharing agreement for 
dividing the leadership by dividing the Iraqi government and KRG’s position. According to this 
agreement, KDP supports Talabani to be either the president or the prime minister of Iraq. 
Likewise, PUK supports Barzani to be president of Kurdistan by creating the position of 
president inside the Kurdistan region.
105
 Additionally, the agreement stipulated that PUK's 
member should hold the speaker of the National Assembly; KDP's member should hold the 
prime minister of Kurdistan region; further, all political parties participate in National election 
and regional election in one list because as the preamble of the agreement stated that PUK and 
KDP’s unification was to protect Kurdish cause inside the federal government of Iraq. 106 
Additionally, the agreement stipulated that the voting for Talabani and Barzani must be 
corresponding obligation.
107
 
On January 30, 2005 general elections were held at three deferent levels. At the federal 
and regional level, both KDP and PUK participated as one list. At the governorate level, PUK 
and KDP participate as one list Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala’s governorates, 108 but PUK and KDP 
participated separately in Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil’s governorates.109 The result of the 
election was very close 2005. 
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 After the election, KDP proposed one package, which was the implementation of a 
power-sharing agreement with PUK. This package was quid pro quo to vote for Talabani to be 
president of Iraq. In return, the KDP requested the following positions be held by KDP members: 
the president of the Kurdistan region, the prime minister of Kurdistan region, the head of security 
forces of Erbil, the minister of finance of KRG, the minister of Peshmerga of KRG, the deputy of 
Iraqi prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs of Iraq.
110
 In offering this package, the 
KDP sought to consolidate its power in the KRG instead of focusing on the federal 
government.
111
 
The president position of KRG was a controversial issue between KDP and PUK.  KDP 
is considered the architect of the presidency law of the region, which was presented to PUK’s 
politburo on April 18 of 2005.
112
 Consequently, PUK proposed that the President should be 
elected inside parliament consistent with the power-sharing agreement to Talabani position in 
Baghdad. Talabani was elected inside parliament. Thus, PUK wanted to elect Barzani inside the 
parliament as well. Further, PUK wanted to make consistency between the Talabani mandate in 
Baghdad and Barzani mandate in Kurdistan region. Thus, PUK insisted on electing Barzani 
inside parliament, not through the popular vote, to create a flexible mandate. PUK, further, 
proposed that the power of the president should be equal and horizontal to the parliament, 
judiciary and the council of minister.
113
 However, KDP refused to accept the modified version of 
the presidency law from PUK’s politburos.114 Still, KDP insisted that the president should be 
directly elected by the people, with a fixed term with the potential for two additional terms. The 
                                                 
110 Mustafa, supra note 105, at 9. 
111 Kenneth Katzman, supra note 37, at 3. 
112 Mustafa, supra note 105, at 15. 
113 Id at 21. 
114 Id at 16. 
 22 
 
president of Kurdistan region should possess the power of the commander in chief and head of 
the National Security Council. 
115
 
Moreover, the KDP argued that the PUK revoked the agreement because KDP had voted 
for Talabani to be interim president of Iraq on April 4, 2005, but the PUK did not fulfill the 
agreement by supporting Barzani to be president of Kurdistan region.
116 Eventually, Barzani and 
Talabani reached an agreement on the KDP’s conditions.117 Their agreement was that for the first 
term, Barzani should be elected by parliament. After that, their agreement provided the president 
would be elected by a direct vote of the people including to all the powers that KDP claimed.
118
 
Consequently, Barzani was elected for his first term through parliament. On June 4, 2005 
parliament convened its meeting and in the June 14, 2006 Barzani has been elected as president 
of the Kurdistan region. At that time, the Kurdistan region system had shifted to a hybrid 
parliamentary which has some elements of semi-presidentialism, even though on the law of KNA 
it stated that the system of Kurdistan region is a parliamentary system.
119
` 
The ministries of Peshmerga, Internal, and finance had remained separate and run by 
double minister of both PUK and KDP. The unification agreement of 2006 was not different, in 
most respects, from the 1992 power-sharing agreement because both provided that if the prime 
minister is KDP the deputy prime minister must be PUK. Also, the agreement allowed prime 
minister to 2 years in that position. It means that the prime minister of KDP has two years as 
prime minister, after which he should resign, and PUK’s Prime ministers should be elected by 
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the parliament with having KDP’s deputy prime minister.120 Practically, this mechanism of 
sharing power highly implicates on the entire region by creating two zones of administration. 
KDP and PUK have created "parallel administration."
121
  PUK has gained full authority over 
Sulimanyah. KDP has extended its power over Erbil and Dohuk. These two zones were 
administrated through power-sharing agreements.
122
 There were two Peshmerga ministries, two 
internal ministries, and two financial ministries. This double ministry continued until April 4, 
2009.
123
  
After 2009, parallel administration was reshaped in a different form: if the prime minister 
was KDP, the power of the prime minister was confined to direct the Erbil and Duhouk’s affairs, 
and his deputy limited to direct Sulaimaniyah’s affairs.124  This division of power was also true 
to other ministers and their deputies.
125
 The budget of the region was divided based on these two 
zones, not based of the fiscal system of unified government. For example, forty three percent of 
the Kurdistan region budget was designated to Sulimanyah. Likewise, fifty seven percent was 
designated to Erbil and Duhouk.
126
 This splitting budget for two coffers continued until 
December 21, 2010.
127
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1.5 Emerging the political oppositions  
Although real political opposition appeared after the 2009 election, 
128
 the wave of 
dissatisfaction and protesting began in 2005.
129
  The political opposition at the beginning 
appeared as civil society and public demonstration as lack of service and criticizing the 
corruption that was widespread throughout the region.
130
 Most of these demonstrations occurred 
in PUK’s zone.  These demonstrations also appeared in firmly controlled KDP’s zone where the 
dissent journalist was killed. These actions triggered considerable protesting and criticizing of 
KDP and PUK’s forces by acting unaccountably without respecting human rights.131 These 
forces have engaged in torture and detaining the people without charges.
132
 Sometimes, some 
Kurdish authority accused the protestors as foreigner agents or vandals as it happened in Halabja 
demonstration.
133
     
 Nonetheless, demonstrations and dissatisfaction were not capable of changing the polity 
which was dominantly controlled by PUK and KDP because of two reasons: First, PUK and 
KDP have prevented the people to participate in these demonstrations and dissatisfaction 
movements.
134
 Second, there was not active political opposition to direct these demonstrations to 
specific goals.
135
 Particularly, KIU (Kurdistan Islamic Union) and KIG (Kurdistan Islamic 
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Group) were very vulnerable to direct these demonstration and dissatisfaction moments because 
their activity was controlled and limited by PUK and KDP.
136
  
  The Goran movement, contrary to KIU and KIG, capitalized on these dissatisfaction 
movements by directing them in the 2009 election.
137
 This directing was the beginning of the 
formation of the political opposition. The Goran movement was the reform wing inside PUK. It 
separated from the PUK due to its difference over renewing the party structures and its 
agenda.
138
 The Goran movement announces itself as a social movement promoting social justice 
and rule of law for the region.
139
 It criticized both PUK and KDP with nepotism and corruption 
in many different fields including public services, public procurements, construction projects, 
distributing public land, and abuse of the administrative power.
140
   
In 2009 election, the Goran movement skillfully managed to direct public frustration in 
creating real political opposition party inside parliament.
141
 The landscape of polity had shifted 
from bipartite powers to tripartite powers.
142
 In this election, twenty-four lists contested for 111 
seats, although only eleven lists were able to secure seats in the parliament.
143
  The turnout was 
very high, with 78.6% participation according to Independent High Electoral Commission.
144
  
The PUK and KDP participated as one list, winning 57 % of the balloted votes. The Goran 
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movement secured 24% of the balloted votes, and the Islamic parties with some other secular 
parties gained 12% of the balloted votes.
145
 Also, the difference in this election from the 2005 
election that the president of Kurdistan region was elected by the direct ballot.
146
 Barzani was 
able to gain 69.60% of the voters among 12 candidates.
147
  
Even though the PUK and KDP were capable of securing their strategic agreement and 
forming the government by gaining 57% of voters, 
148
 the political opposition’s parties had a 
tremendous impact on the public through their media channel.
149
 Predominantly, Goran media 
were flashing out the corruptions and nepotisms which the government was conducting for the 
benefit of PUK and KDP.
150
 Besides the influences of the media, the Goran with two others, the 
Islamic Party - Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), formed the 
political opposition coalition.
151
 In the beginning, the relation among the Goran, KIU, and KIG 
was not robust as appeared after February 17 of 2011. 
The influence of the political opposition has appeared more robust since February 17 of 
2011 and following incidents. At that date, the people of Sulimanyah, inspired by the Arab 
spring incidents, to show their solidarity with Egypt and Tunisia demonstrations,
 152
 gathered in  
Sara, the downtown of Sulimanyah city.  After ending peaceful demonstration in Sara, dispersed 
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demonstrators rallied to Salm Street. They passed by the fourth branch of KDP, and a tension 
occurred there that led these dispersed demonstrators to throw stones towards the fourth branch 
of KDP.
153
  KDP’s guards reacted and opened fire on the demonstrators. As a result of this 
incident, two protestors were killed, and forty-three were injured in half an hour.
154
   
This incident exacerbated relation between Goran and KDP because KDP pointed the 
finger to Goran supporters and vice versa.
155
 The Goran branch was either burned or plundered 
in Erbil city, Dohuk city, Soran district, Bnaslaw district, and the Shaqlawa district during the 
plundering and burning process.
156
 The NRT TV, an independent media channel, was burned by 
unknown militia due to the fact NRT was vigorously covering the protestors’ activities.157  KDP 
moved its special forces, Zervani forces, with the pretext of protecting the fourth branch of KDP. 
Even moving Zervani forces was without the permission of the parliament and the president. 
158
  
After February 17 of 2011, thousands of demonstrator flooded on the street protesting KDP and 
PUK of corruption and nepotism. The KDP’s student association shutdown Salahaddin 
University for one month by sending students to home in order to prevent the demonstration in 
Erbil.
159
 The mainstream of protesting was about the economic monopolization, freedom of the 
speech, and freedom of the press.
160
 This monopolization has reduced the opportunity of those 
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people who do not have support from the KDP and PUK. Overall, 10 demonstrators were killed 
and 250 others were injured in these demonstrations.
161
 
By bringing the demonstrators demand to the parliament, the political opposition bloc 
gradually represented peoples’ dissatisfaction movements. They become a voice of the 
demonstrators in the parliament. Particularly, when the Parliament of Kurdistan was convened 
for an emergency session to discuss the recent incidents and demonstrator’s demands, KIU, KIG, 
and the Goran movement, in that session, almost requested the same demand, which was 
reflecting of demonstrators demands and fundamental reform in the polity, respecting rule of 
law, and emphasizing on the government accountability to the parliament and the people.
162
 
Moreover, the Goran movement proposed the motion of dissolving the parliament and 
governmental cabinet. In its place, the interim government should be established to unify and 
nationalize Peshmerga, security forces (Asaysh, and Counter-Terror forces) because these forces 
had been divided between PUK and KDP since 2005 despite the unification of the 
government.
163
 In addition, Goran demanded pre-dated election and the returning of the draft 
constitution of the Kurdistan region, which was approved and set forth to referendum  by the 
parliament in 2009, to the parliament to be modified by consensus of all political powers.
164
 
 Additionally, in that emergency session, the Parliament responded to demonstrators and 
protestors by approving Resolution No.1 of 2011. This resolution includes two track solutions: 
first, the immediate solution to the current crises including criminal investigation on killing 
demonstrators, banning military and militant moving from one city to another, providing remedy 
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for those who were injured or harmed in property, prohibiting peshmerga to interfere with 
internal political issues, and interrogation of the prime minister, minister of peshmerga and 
minister of internal for power abuses by government officials and others measures.
165
 
Second, the long-run solution was conceptualized in article 16 by stating all those laws 
and statutes that have national and strategic aspect of the public interest should be enacted in the 
Parliament with consensus of all political factions.
166
 This provision was a reflection of 
demonstrators’ demanded that the draft constitution should be reviewed in the light of the 
modern principle of democracy, and the president of Kurdistan region should be elected inside 
parliament instead of direct popular voting. 
167
  Explicitly, this provision was designed for 
reconciliation of the opposition bloc (Goran, KIU, and KIG) and the government bloc (PUK and 
KDP) over the draft constitution.  
Nonetheless, the demonstrators in Sulimanyah were suppressed cruelly on April 18 of 
2011.
168
  Further, these aforementioned provisions of the resolution were only some immediate 
solutions implemented by the government. The long-run solutions were not implemented, 
including returning the draft constitution to the parliament.
169
 Despite these facts, Nechervan 
Barzani, KDP’s nominee to be prime minister after Barham Salah,170 tried to pull the political 
opposition bloc to participate in the government cabinet.
171
 The Goran movement refused to take 
part in the government cabinet because the promises of PUK and KDP to reform in the political 
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system were not being implemented especially the long-run solution including the draft 
constitution reconciliation.
172
  
Extending the term of Barzani by the parliament provided new venues for political 
opposition to criticize the KDP and PUK and to direct the public’s dissatisfactions.173 Before the 
2013 election for the Kurdistan parliament and the presidency of Kurdistan region, the KDP  
demanded that PUK extend Barzani’s presidential term for a third term because Barzani already 
had served both of his two terms ( 2005 to 2009 and 2009 to 2013). Legally, it is impossible to 
reelect himself for the third term.
174
 The KDP wanted to set the draft constitution to a 
referendum because the article 64 of the draft will allows Barzani to reelect himself ,
175
 or to 
reinterpret or amend the law of presidency No. 1 of 2005.
176
 However, the PUK and KDP 
brought the draft of law that allows Barzani to remain on the presidency seat from August, 20, 
2013 to August, 20 ,2015 until the consensus would be concluded on the draft constitution 
among the political factions of the parliament.
177
  
The political opposition parties considered extending the term of Barzani  as the coup 
d’état on the people’s right to vote and legitimacy of the political system because, according to 
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current law of the presidency, the president should be elected by direct popular vote and its 
allowed only for two terms.
178
 The Goran movements’ critique affected the PUK voters in 2013 
election because, to some degree, Goran and PUK have the same grassroots mostly in 
Sulimanyah governorate.
179
 Extending Barzani’ presidency’s term by PUK was one factor that 
affected PUK’s grassroots to vote for Goran movement.180 The Goran movement has got 24 
seats, and it lost one seat comparing to the previous election.
181
 The KIU gained 10 seats and 
increased 4 seats comparing to the previous election. KIG secured 6 seats increased 2 seats 
comparing to the previous election. KDP have increased to 38 seats from 30 seats.
182
 PUK 
gained 18 seats decrease 11 seats. Despite the allegation of forgery in the electoral process, 
183
 
the political opposition parties have kept their influences in 2013 elections.  
1.6 The consensus government  
The 2013 election has altered the political landscape in the Kurdistan region. Notably, 
when the Goran movements placed itself as second political player after KDP.
184
 However, this 
shifting was different from other forming government because KDP was no longer capable of 
forming the government with PUK due to the fact PUK considerably lost its seats.
185
 PUK could 
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no longer bargain as it was the case in 2009 and 2005.
186KDP’s nominated candidate to form a 
government was Nechirvan Barzani.
187
 KDP from the beginning of the negotiating on 
government wanted the consensus government by bringing the opposition bloc to get their share 
from the government cabinet. The vigorous contest was among the Goran and PUK. Goran 
argued that it was entitled to receive government portfolios based on being second powers. The 
PUK argued that it had the right to receive the government portfolios based on historical 
prerogative.
188
  
All political powers try to adapt to the new reality that the election’s result brought.189  Of 
course, the impact of this new reality reflected on the forming government that took eight months 
and 28 days to obtain the vote of confidence by the Parliament.
190
 KIU, KIG, and Groan 
movement has participated in government cabinet with the condition of implementing the 
fundamental reform in the political system including revising the constitution, changing the 
system to parliamentary, and tackling the issue of corruption and nepotism.
191
 The PUK has 
joined the government reluctantly; this reluctancy could associated with the fact that the 
government could be formed without the participation of PUK. On the June 18 of 2014 the 
consensus government has been established by participating all political powers.
192
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This new cabinet has started with two big difficulties. The Kurdistan region’s budget was 
held by the federal Iraqi government, 
193
 and ISIS has controlled several Kurdish towns of 
Kurdistan region. These difficulties could postpone the reform packages of political opposition 
for a while.
194
 Apparently in this new composition, the parliament has less experienced the 
political tension inside the parliament comparing to the previous parliament. Partially this could 
be related to the nature of the consensus government because all the draft of laws before 
forwarded to discussion, all heads of factions agrees on them. Then, they will pass it to 
parliament for debate and discussion.
195
 Nevertheless, the political tension over the reform in the 
polity and the constitution could emerge while the Barzani’s presidency is getting to elapse.196 
This consensus government might not resist the accumulated constitutional problems that might 
appear in the future.
197
 
1.7 The draft constitution of Kurdistan region 
In the course of history, the draft constitution has been utilized mainly to enhance the 
Kurdistan region’s authority against the Iraq government and it has been used as consolidation 
the power of PUK and KDP against internal players of KRG.  The draft constitution has been 
utilized for enhancing and consolidating the powers of the Kurdish cause in Iraq since 1974.
198
 It 
was first initiated by as the proposal for Iraqi central government in 1974 -part of the peace 
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agreement.
199
 In that time, the draft was titled as the Basic Law of the Federal State of 
Kurdistan.
200
 The Iraqi central government, however, drafted and ratified the autonomy law 
instead of the Kurdish draft.
201
  
In addition to the draft of 1974, the Kurdistan region has four more drafts. The second 
draft was proposed to the Kurdistan national assembly by thirty-three members of KDP and PUK 
in 1992.
202
 However, it was not approved and remained as the draft.
203
  The third draft of the 
constitution including 84 articles was adopted by the National Assembly of Kurdistan region (the 
parliament of Kurdistan region) through the resolution 26 of 2002.
204
 This resolution further 
obligated all political parties to bind by this draft as the final draft of the constitution.
205
 This 
draft was written by the committee were consisted of 11 members among judges, university 
professors, and lawyers. This committee in their drafting process depended on the draft of 
1974.
206
  
In 2005, the Iraqi federal constitution was adopted by the people of Iraq. The new Iraqi 
constitution has required the revising of the draft constitution of Kurdistan region in the light of 
Iraqi federal constitution. 
207
 The Kurdistan parliament enacted the resolution no 4 of 2005.
208
 
This resolution stipulated revising the draft of 2002, and the forming the drafting committee to 
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revise it.
209
 The drafting committee was created by resolution No 5 of 2005.
210
 This committee 
mainly was directed by PUK and KDP’ members of the parliament.211 This committee started on 
September 6, 2005 to August 22 of 2006.
212
  They produced the draft of 2006 which consists of 
160 articles.
213
 Also, it can be considered as a fourth draft. 
The approving the draft of 2006 and referendum on it were neglected until the end of 
2009. 
214
 While the Goran was emerging as the political opposition, 
215
 both PUK and KDP were 
aware that Goran would be an influential political player in the parliament, and it would create 
obstacles to their agenda.
216
  The parliament extended the legal term of itself by the majority 
despite the fact that legally the parliament term was served for four years,
217
 and its term had 
ended since it functioned four years from the date of its first convention.
218
 The extension was 
with the pretext that the parliament did not approve the public budget.
219
 The parliament term, 
for this reason, should be extended in order to approve the public budget.
220
 This extending was 
part of the political game to use the draft constitution as a powerful tool to consolidate KDP and 
PUK powers against the other political players apparently since 2009.
221
 
                                                 
209 Article 1&2, Resolution No.4 of 2005, Al-Waqā’i Kurdistan [Kurdistan Official Gazette] 61 of July.16, 2005, at 
10 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
210 Resolution No.5 of 2005, Al-Waqā’i Kurdistan [Kurdistan Official Gazette] 61 of July. 16, 2005, at 11 
(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
211 Lezhnay Pedachwnawy Dastur, supra note 198, at 25.  
212 Id at 33,  
213 Id at 24. 
214 See Editorial, Parlamni Mawa Basrchw Dastur Hal Daprukenyt [The Expired Parliament Approves the Draft 
Constitution in a Rush Way], June.14, 2009, at 1. 
215 See Reben Fatah, Parti u Yakti Prozhay Dastur wak Propaganda Bakar Dahenen[PUK and KDP use the draft 
constitution as a part of propaganda campaign], ROZHENAMA NEWSPAPER, June.14, 2009, at 3. 
216 Id.  
217 Falah Najem & Ibrahim Ali, Yakgrtu W Komal Pashiman Dabnawa [KIU and KIG Retreated From Their 
Position], ROZHENAMA NEWSPAPER, June. 24, 2009, at 2.  
218 See Resolution No.6 of 2009, Al-Waqā’i Kurdistan [Kurdistan Official Gazette] 100 of June. 1, 2009, at 29 
(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
219 See Reben Fatah, supra note 215. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
 36 
 
 On June 22, 2009, forty members of the parliament boycotted the parliament’s session as 
protesting the drafting process and setting the date of the referendum on it. Mohammed Hakim, 
member of KIG’s politburo and member of the parliament, stated, “PUK and KDP will vote for 
the draft whether we are with it or not.” Also he added, “Barzani explicitly told us that the 
election day of the parliament and referendum on the draft will be the same date.”222 In the one 
session of the extended term of the parliament, PUK and KDP brought another draft constitution, 
which was different from 2006 draft, and it includes 122 articles. 
223
Theoretically, this draft 
could be considered as a 2009 draft. Kurdistan Parliament approved the draft of 2009 by a 
majority of its members during extend period of the parliament.
224
 This approving process, 
nevertheless, has several legal procedural defects. For instance, any statutes or laws must be 
scheduled before in the parliament’s agenda in order to establish notice to the members of the 
parliament. Otherwise, any statute without a scheduled timetable is considered as void according 
to article 54 section 2 and 3 of the parliament by-law.  Further, any statute before approving must 
have two readings. The first reading should provide the brief introduction of the bill in the 
parliament sessions after that it must be sent to specialized committees to study it.
225
 Second 
reading is after period when the specialized committee have concluded the opinion about the bill 
and they formatted it as legal provisions.
226
 Then, the Member of Parliament has prerogative to 
discuss all of its content. After discussion, the bills will be ready for voting article by article.
227
 
In addition, there were many claims around the committee of the drafting and the 
parliament’s actions related to the draft. There were allegations that the draft committee changed 
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some part of the draft without knowledge of the other members.
228
 The Goran movement and 
some civil activists argued that the parliament itself after June 4, 2009 had lost it legitimacy.
229
 It 
is not allowed to Parliament to extend its term in order to approve the draft constitution during 
this critical time. Some civil activist argued that it is not legitimate to vote on the draft 
constitution because the people did not have enough time to read its content and acknowledge its 
implications.
230
 To more illustrate, the draft of 2006 was published and the draft of 2009 was not 
published at that time.
231
 
This draft was approved by the statute, which is also set July 25, 2009 as the date of the 
referendum on it. 
232
 The statute stipulated that the draft constitution must be considered 
enforceable if the majority of the voters approved it.
233
  The independent high electoral 
commission of Iraq (IHECI), however, refused to conduct a referendum due to logistics and 
procedures.
234
 The after receiving the IHECI’s respond, Kurdistan parliament enacted another 
statute to determine the issue of the referendum date. It provides another procedure that the date 
of the referendum must be set by coordination of parliament presidium and the council of 
ministers.
235
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However, the issue of the draft constitution was not put in the referendum. After 2011, 
the demonstration of February directed the draft constitution. The resolution 1 of 2011 implicitly 
furnished another venue to the draft that should be approved based on the consensus of all 
political factions.
236
 In 2013, Barzani presidency’s coming to the end, the debate over the 
referendum on the draft constitution came back again because the article 64 of the draft of 
constitution allows Barzani to reelect himself to third and fourth term.
237
 Abdulrazaq Sharif, 
media director of PUK’s politburo, stated that KDP offered PUK three options. These options are 
revoking the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK, returning Kurdistan regional 
government for PUK’s zone and KDP’s zone, and extending Barzani presidency term.238 The 
PUK chose the third option and with KDP passed the statute that is extending Barzani’s term for 
two years. While extending presidency term, the political parties should seek on getting 
consensus on the draft.
239
 
After 2013 election, all political factions have participated in the forming government.
240
 
Sixty one members of parliament proposed the draft of the statute that determine the process of 
creating a new committee to revise the draft constitution of 2009. The draft statute was approved 
in April 13 of 2015.
241
 Approving of the revised draft of the constitution should be based on the 
consensus of all political parties. This new committee was formed and consisted of 21 members 
to finish revising the draft in the three months. The distribution of 21 seats to political parties 
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http://dfr.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?p=88&l=12&s=030400&r=403 
241 See the Law of Preparing The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2015. 
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was based on the Sainte-Laguë method. Thus, KDP received 7 seats.  Initially, PUK received 3 
seats, but Goran gave up one of its seats for PUK. Thus, PUK’s seats became 4 seats. Goran 
received 4 seats after abounding one of its seats to PUK. KIU received 2 seats. KIG received 1 
seat.
242
 Turkmen and Syric minorities received 2 seats. The small political parties which have 
one seat in the parliament, they received 1 seat in the committee.
243
   
 The overall revised draft of the constitution should be approved by the vote of two-third 
of members of the parliament. The draft also should be approved by the majority of voters in 
general referendum. Nevertheless, the committee of revising draft should decide on each article 
by consensus. Currently, this draft has logged at this stage. Also. There is the likelihood of 
escalating political tension when the Kurdistan region is getting close to August 20 of 2015 
because the extended Presidency term comes to end. The scenarios of the draft will be an open 
question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
242 N. M. Mohammad ,Committee Of Constitution Preparation Project: We Are Independent And Not Related To 
Anything Or Anyone, THE KURDISH GLOBE (01 June 2015, 03:49 GMT), 
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/2E127A5FCD182739BFE6DCB0CEC07F4B/Committee-of-constitution-
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243 Editorial, Parliament Agree On Kurdistan Draft Constitution Committee, WAAR MEDIA(2015/05/04 - 4:46 PM), 
http://waarmedia.com/english/parliament-agree-on-kurdistan-draft-constitution-committee/ 
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Chapter II: 
Introduction:    
This chapter begins by elaborating the concept of political accountability. It addresses the 
mechanism of accountability and its relations with a form of government. Then, this mechanism 
is applied to the form of government in KR under existing structures and draft structures in 
relation to the answerability and enforcement phase of political accountability. It addresses the 
design defects inherent in the existing system ( a form of government, Kurdistan region Security 
Council, the sovereignty of parliament) and its impact on political accountability.  It elaborates 
on the contextual factors that have an impact on the political will of the Parliament in exerting its 
powers including mass party, party discipline, electoral system. 
2.1. Political Accountability 
The concept of political accountability is a debatable notion in terms of definition and its 
content.
244
 Political accountability, moreover, streams from the theory of “delegated powers” or 
the ownerships of authority. This theory has been endorsed in liberal democracies that the people 
are sovereigns, and the government gains the legitimacy by having a delegation of authority from 
the people. Ultimate ownership of authority lay in the people, and the government should 
exercise governmental powers with the name and will of the people. In this context, the people 
are principal, and the government is an agent to act on behalf of the principal (people). 
                                                 
244
 RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 5 (2004); See 
also Józef Niżnik, Theoretical and Empirical Dimensions of Accountability, in POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS 7, 11 (Józef Niżnik & Natalya Ryabinska eds., 2007) 
(Niżnik contends that the political accountability and its contents could involve “Norms and procedures” of 
institutions, “social-psychological factors," “public awareness” including activity of “civil society," influence of the 
media.).  
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Therefore, the government is accountable for its actions due to the delegated powers relation 
between the government and the people.
245
 
 Despite different definitions of political accountability, there are many common themes. 
Erkkilä explains political accountability as “[t]hose who govern have to answer for their actions 
to a wider public either directly, when politically elected or appointed, or indirectly as 
subordinates of politically elected bodies. If they fail to do so, they can be substituted in 
democratic elections. This constant threat forces the ruling government to respond to the 
demands of a constituency, who can thus hold their government to account”246 Likewise, Mulgan 
contends that political accountability requires “the account-holder to investigate and scrutinize 
the actions of the agent by seeking information and explanations and the right to impose 
remedies and sanctions. Conversely, for the accountor, the agent, accountability implies the duty 
to inform and explain to the account-holder and to accept remedies and sanctions.”247  
Moreover, Schedler conceptualizes political accountability as two phases that are the 
common traits among abovementioned definitions. First, the “answerability” phase where the 
agent is responsible for responding to the questions and inquiries of the principal and the 
principal has the right to pursue and obtain information from the agent in conjunction with 
                                                 
245 See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 12-13 
(2004) ( Although the delegated powers concept is substantial to hold the government accountable, it implies narrow 
scope of political accountability which implicates the accountability of the government to citizens only. 
Consequently, it may exclude the accountability of the government to “temporary residents or transient foreigners.” 
Hence, The theory of “affected rights” in conjunction with the theory of “delegated powers” expands the 
government accountability by asserting that government possess “coercive powers” and its powers impacts the 
“interest and rights” of those persons who lives under the auspices of the government. Accordingly, the government 
should be held accountable by virtue of its powers); See also Tero Erkkilä, Governance and Accountability-A Shift 
in Conceptualisation, 31 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY 1, 10(2007) 
246 Tero Erkkilä, Governance and Accountability-A Shift in Conceptualisation, 31 Public Administration 
Quarterly1, 10(2007) 
247 RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 10 (2004). 
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agent’s justifications. 248 Second, the “enforcement” phase purely implies a carrot and stick 
approach.
 249
 If the answers and justifications of the agent do not convince the principal, the 
principal has the right to impose an appropriate punishment to discourage the agents from 
inappropriate behavior.
250
 Further, neointuitionalists not only highlight the significance of 
questionings and inquiries about the agent’s actions but they also emphasize the sanction 
approach which incentivizes the agent to act appropriately.
251
 The role of sanctions 
(enforcement) is fundamental to hold an agent accountable because revealing misconducts of the 
agent without punishment is perceived as “window dressing” and doesn’t confine the behavior of 
the agent. 
252
 
However, the rigidity of the sanction (enforcement phase) and its degree vary in the 
political context.
253
 The sanction could be “public exposure” or discharge from public office.254 
Sometimes if the violation of the agents is extreme, sanctions may include a trial.
255
 The degrees 
of sanctions are characterized in the following three examples. The motion of censure, which is 
exercised by the legislative branch and mainly common in a presidential system, exposes the 
government officials to the public’s criticism. It has implications on their reputations.256 It can be 
found in Argentina, Burundi, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Namibia.
257
  The motion of no-confidence 
and interpellation, which are mainly widespread in a parliamentary system and semi-presidential 
                                                 
248 Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 17 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999).  
249See Id at 14-15. 
250Id at 15. 
251Id at 16. 
252Id. 
253Id. 
254Id. 
255Id. 
256 See RICCARDO PELIZZO & FREDERICK STAPENHURST, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE 
OVERSIGHT 10-11(2014) (It should be noted that, in some presidential systems, the motion of censure may lead to 
impeachment process as it can be observed in Liberia.).  
257 Id at 34 tbl.3.1. 
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system, could be categorized as dismissal from the public office.
258
 It can be carried out against a 
prime minister or ministers.
259
 The impeachment is a punishment for president or other public 
officials for violation of a constitution.
260
 For instance, in the United States, impeaching a 
President involves conviction from house and trial in the Senate by the Judiciary.
261
 
The accountability concept has been classified for many typologies in a political 
context.
262
 However, this analysis deals with a dominant understanding of accountability that 
divided the accountability by horizontal and vertical accountability.
263
  Horizontal accountability 
occurs among the symmetric government branches or government agencies that hold each other 
accountable. The “checks and balance” mechanisms among the government branches is a 
formula of horizontal accountability which take place among symmetric actors.
264
 Examples of 
symmetric players are the “executive, legislative and judiciary.”265 Moreover, there are 
independent agencies in modern democracies which plays a significant role in scrutinizing the 
action of other branches of government such as ombudsman and general auditing.”266 The 
effectiveness of horizontal accountability depends on cooperation among intrastate institutions in 
checking each other’s and having de jure and de facto autonomies.267 Conversely, the vertical 
accountability implies asymmetric relationships among the actors.  In other words, this 
relationship bears unbalanced authority between the accouter (agent) and account-holder 
                                                 
258Id at 12. 
259Id at 11&13. 
260 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 12; See also Akhil Reed Amar, A Symposium on the Impeachment 
of William Jefferson Clinton: Reflections on the Process, the Results, and the Future, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 292-
293(1999). 
261  PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 12. 
262
 Id at 3-5. 
263 Id at 3.  
264 Andreas Schedler, supra note 248, at 23. 
265 Id. 
266 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 3.  
267 Guillermo O'Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 41 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999). 
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(principal).
268
 The idea of vertical accountability requires the public to restrain the government 
official. The electoral accountability of politicians towards citizens is the form of vertical 
accountability.
269
  
Vertical accountability and horizontal accountability are useful criteria to determine the 
trait of democracy and its features because accountability concept reflects in “procedural 
….definition of democracies.”270 “[C]hecks and balance,” which is apparatus of horizontal 
accountability, is invented to protect the democracies from self-interested politicians and 
preserving democracies from its perils.
271
 The election process, which is an apparatus of vertical 
accountability, is created to avoid system transformation from democracy to oligarchy.
272
 
Moreover, in those countries which have a "competitive authoritarian regime” or “electoral 
autocracies” incumbent regimes tend to reduce vertical and horizontal accountability by 
eliminating those institutions that “check political actors”, or by patronizing voters, or by 
committing “electoral fraud”, or by extending the term of an incumbent president. In those 
regimes, increasing corruption and abuse of human rights are highly correlated with decreasing 
horizontal and vertical accountability.
273
 
2.2 The choice of the system and its relations with accountability mechanisms: 
The choice of the system, whether it is a parliamentary system, semi-presidential, or 
presidential system, has a correlation with means and mechanism of accountability in both 
                                                 
268 Andreas Schedler, supra note 248, at 23; See also MULGAN, supra note 247, at 11-15. 
269 Andreas Schedler, supra note 248, at 23; See also PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 3. 
270 Philippe C. Schmitter, The Limit of Horizontal Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 59, 59 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999). 
271 Richard L.Sklar, Democracy and Constitutionalism: Comments on O’Donnell, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: 
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 53, 53-54 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner ed., 1999). 
272 Id 
273 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 199-201(2013). 
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phases of accountability-answerability and enforcement.
274
 For instance, the legislatures, for 
promoting answerability, possess a range of apparatus including legislature committees, 
questioning processes, the ability to scrutinize government appointment.
275
 Moreover, for 
promoting the enforcement phase of accountability, the legislatures possess various apparatus 
including “notion of confidence, motion of censure, impeachment, and election/selections of 
cabinet ministers”.276 
Implementing the apparatus above are associated with the type and the form of 
government.
277
 In order to erase the confusion over the forms of government and its relation with 
accountability mechanisms, one can find it useful to apply these mechanisms on the “pure form” 
of parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism.
278
 Hence, to define each of these 
forms of government, it is necessary to analyze in term of conventional trends because not all 
forms of government are alike.
279
 For instance, the parliamentary system, which is widespread in 
Commonwealth countries, is different from those in southern Europe.
280
  Likewise, a presidential 
system that is popular in Latin American countries is unlike presidential formula of United 
States. 
281
 It is also true that semi-presidentialism in France is dissimilar from those common in 
Eastern Europe.
282
 
In United Kingdom’s parliamentary system, the executive’s existence depends on the 
confidence of the legislature. Through the motion of confidence, the legislature ensures the 
                                                 
274 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 9-10. 
275 Id. 
276 Id at 10. 
277 Id. 
278 Mark Freeman, Constitutional Frameworks And Fragile Democracies: Choosing Between Parliamentarianism, 
Presidentialism And Semi-Presidentialism, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 253, 261-263 (2000). 
279 Id. 
280 Mark Freeman, supra note 278; See also PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING 
INSTITUTIONS WORK? 35 (2008). 
281 Mark Freeman, supra note 278. 
282 Id. 
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accountability of executives towards legislators and voters.
283
 The system possesses the fusion of 
powers in which the executive branch- prime ministers and ministers- is part of the legislative 
body.
284
 The prime minister and ministers are members of the parliament.
285
 They are 
representing their constituencies- vertical accountability to voters via elections- and they are also 
accountable to the legislative body- horizontal accountability to legislative via a motion of 
confidence.
286
 The head of state is the ceremonial position.  Further, opposition political parties 
exert questioning and interpellations to force the cabinet ministers to justify their actions on a 
“regular basis” (usually daily).287Moreover, the parliamentary committee is another venue that 
political opposition supervises the government actions.
288
 For example, the committee of public 
accounts is always directed and chaired by political oppositions.
289
  It appears the committee 
oversight is not active, but it is related to the political parties’ formations and party discipline 
under UK parliamentary system.
290
 
The separation of powers is the main characteristic of United State’s the presidential 
system. Both legislatures and president are elected separately, and they have fixed terms. The 
president’s survival does not require the confidence of the legislatures. The members of the 
executive branch are not a part of the legislative body.
291
 The daily questioning process as exists 
in the parliamentary system does not exist in the presidential system.  Further, the upper house 
(Senate) scrutinizes the members of the president’s cabinet when the president proposes them to 
                                                 
283 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 10. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
286 Id at 10-11. 
287 Id at 11. 
288 Id. 
289 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 11; See also David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE 
L.J. 548, 572-573 (2009). 
290 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at 11. 
291 Id at 12.  
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be confirmed by the upper house.
292
 The committee’s investigations tend to be strong under 
United States’. Removing the President from the office is possible only through the impeachment 
procedure. 
In France’s semi-presidential system, both the features of parliamentary and presidential 
are harmonized mutually.
293
 Semi-presidentialism is the system that the president is elected by 
direct vote, and the government’s existence depends on the confidence of the legislatures.294 It is 
also characterized by the separation of powers. In this system, the president is hardly accountable 
to the legislatures and the only way to remove the president is through the impeachment 
procedure.
295
 The prime minister is a head of the government and accountable to the parliament 
similar to the way that exists in parliamentary systems. The prime minister and its minister can 
be removed in the office collectively by a vote of no-confidence.
296
 
At the enforcement phase of accountability under all these system, the impeachment and 
vote of no-confidence create distinctive ex-post accountability of the executive towards 
legislatures generally. The vote of no-confidence can be ignited by a “policy controversy” or 
“legal transgression” between the government and parliament because under parliamentarism, it 
is presumed that the government is the agent of the parliament.
297
 The vote of no-confidence is a 
core element of the parliamentary democracy.
298
  The vote of no-confidence is not only directly 
                                                 
292Id. 
293 See also MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS150-156(1992) (Semi-presidential systems are not alike because the legislative 
powers and non-legislative powers of elected president under semi presidentialism are vary.). 
294See Robert Elgie, supra note 75; See also PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING 
INSTITUTIONS WORK? 145-146 (2008). 
295 PELIZZO & STAPENHURST, supra note 256, at12. 
296 See JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY 37 (2007). 
297 Kaare Strøm, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, 37 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL RESEARCH 261, 274(2000). 
298 Kaare Strøm, supra note 297, at 265; See also Juan J. Linz , The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 JOURNAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 51, 52(1990). 
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applicable to the prime minister but also triggers the collective removal of the government 
cabinet.
299
 The collective accountability of the cabinet rises from the fact that the decision-
making in the government is collective. Thus, they share the collective responsibility.
300
 The 
government is the agent of the parliament, and the parliament is the agent of the voters. Thus, the 
parliament should realize the voters’ demands through governments.301 
  However, the impeachment cannot be initiated based on “policy differences” because, 
under presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, the president is not accountable for policy 
implementing of legislatures.
302
 The president is not the agent of the legislative body.
303
  The 
president is politically and directly responsible to the voters, not the legislatures.
304
 The president 
is not answerable to the legislature on a daily basis.
305
 Impeachment is confined to crimes or 
constitutional violations such as high crimes or treason.
306
 In other words, the impeachment is 
limited to “legal transgressions” of the president. The president’s impeachment does not lead to 
the collective removal of the cabinet, but rather it is a legal process directed at the president 
individually.
307
 The legislature in the presidential or semi-presidential systems tries the president 
not as the principal but as a “sanctioning actor”.308 The “sanctions actors” does not rely on the 
                                                 
299 MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, supra note 293, at 4&6. 
300
 PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS WORK? 144 (2008). 
301 Kaare Strøm, supra note 297, at 274. 
302
 PIPPA NORRIS, supra note 300, at 144-145. 
303
 MARGIT TAVITS, PRESIDENTS WITH PRIME MINISTERS: DO DIRECT ELECTIONS MATTER? 34(2008). 
304 Murray Clark Havens & Dixie Mercer McNeil, Presidents, Impeachment, and Political Accountability, 8 
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 5, 6-8 (1978). 
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306 See François Frison-Roche, Semi-Presidentialism In A Post-Communist Context , in SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 
OUTSIDE EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 60 (Robert Elgie & Sophia Moestrup eds., 2007); See also Eugene 
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PRESIDENTIALISM OUTSIDE EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 169 (Robert Elgie & Sophia Moestrup eds., 2007); See 
also Murray Clark Havens & Dixie Mercer McNeil, supra note 304. 
307 CHEIBUB, supra note 296 at 64. 
308 Scott Mainwaring, Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America, In DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN LATIN AMERICA 20 (Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds., 2003). 
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principle-agent relations in their actions.
309
 For instance, when the judiciary sanctions the 
executive members, the judiciary is not a principal of the executive.
310
 
It is reasonable for the president to have different policies from the legislature and not be 
accountable to the legislatures’ policies because the voter support for the presidency is based on 
a national election,
311
 While the elections for the legislature could be based on the national level 
or local level. The preference of voters for the legislatures is not necessarily congruent with the 
president’s policies because the functions of these two bodies are different. Voters may choose 
sets of policies for particulars party policies for the presidency while they choose another party’s 
policies for the legislature.
312
 In other words, the “dual legitimacy” of the president and 
legislatures could bring different policies.
313
 When policies of the legislatures are different from 
the president’s policies, this difference may lead to the deadlock that cannot be resolved by the 
impeachment.
314
 
2.3 The form of government in Kurdistan region 
In KR, government institutions have evolved over time. The National Assembly emerged 
as the first institutions (see chapter one). All other institutions are created by the national 
assembly (Kurdistan Parliament).
315
 The constitutional system is substantially affected by 
political fluctuations of civil war, two administration periods and strategic agreements.
316
 The 
compromising on the form of government and craving the institution for particular persons or 
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particular political party produces many anomalies in the checks and balance procedure-
horizontal accountability.
317
  Sometimes, the institutions have been created to preserves the 
status-quo of a dual administrative system among the PUK and KDP.
318
  
The upshot of these negotiations result in producing serious flaws in the accountability 
mechanisms and have established institutions outside of the parliament oversight, such as 
Kurdistan Region Security Council. It creates a system that is difficult to identify as 
parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential under existing definitions. The system could be 
perceived as some hybrid formula of parliamentary. Nevertheless, under the draft constitution, 
one can rationally conclude that the system is presidential, not semi- presidential.  
In KR, the major political institutions are the Presidency of Kurdistan Region that is 
directed by the president and vice president.
319
 The president is elected by popular vote,
320
 and 
appoints the vice president.
321
 The president can serve for four years from the date of 
elections.
322
 Under existing structures despite the fact that the president is popularly elected, he 
or she can be removed from office by a no-confidence vote.
323
 Nonetheless, under the draft, the 
president can be removed only through impeachment.
324
 The council of ministers which is 
headed by the prime minister consists of 21 ministers.
325
 The council of ministers receives the 
                                                 
317 See Michael Rubin, Kurdistan’s ‘$265 million’ National Security Council: Nepotism not good governance, THE 
KURDISTAN TRIBUNE( July 12, 2012), http://kurdistantribune.com/2012/kurdistans-265-million-dollar-national-
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318 See Andrew Lee Butters, Trouble in Kurdistan, TIME (Friday, Mar. 17, 
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324 Article 95, Section 6 & Article 63, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan 
Region] of 2009. 
325 See Official Website of Kurdistan Regional Government, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=315&p=228&h=1 
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confidence of parliament by a majority of the quorum.
326
 The council of ministers can be voted 
out by a two-thirds vote of the parliament with the agreement of the President to enact a decree.  
Without this consent, the Parliament cannot vote the council of ministers out.
327
 The parliament 
consists of 111 members who are elected using a proportional representation system with a 
relatively closed-list.
328
 The parliament is headed by the presidium that consists of three persons: 
a speaker, deputy of the speaker and a secretary of the parliament. 
329
 
 To understand implications of constitutional structures which increase the executive 
branch and party leader’s ability in mitigating the role of the parliament, one has to look at the 
existing constitutional structures and draft structures in designing the accountability mechanism. 
In addition, the draft constitution espouses the existing structures with some slight modifications 
in three areas “the enforcement level of political accountability, the form of government, and the 
sovereignty of the Parliament ”. Nevertheless, the other areas of the answerability phase of 
political accountability are quite identical to existing structures. Therefore, there is a need to first 
address the current structures. After discussion of the current constitutional arrangement, the 
draft constitutions will also be addressed briefly. Further, this section addresses the enforcement 
phase and answerability phase of political accountability in the current arrangement and the draft 
constitutions. 
                                                 
326 Article 50, Section 2, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 
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327 Article 10, Section 13, Presidency Law No 1 of 2005(Kurdistan Region-Iraq); See also Article 65, Section16, 
Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009. 
328 Article 1, Kurdistan National Assembly Law No.1 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). See also Chapter 2 & 
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2.3.1 Form of government under existing arrangement and draft constitution  
Some researchers define the current arrangement of the Kurdish region as semi-
presidentialism. 
330
Nevertheless, the problematic point of their analysis is that they focus only on 
the electing process of the president and the parliament which are done from a separate 
electorate.
331
 Likewise, they analyze the broad power of the president with direct elections and 
the separate election of the parliament.
332
 Separate electorate for president and parliament is not 
sufficient criteria to determine the nature of the system because there are countries where, 
despite having presidents that are elected “direct[ly] or quasi-direct[ly],”are considered as 
parliamentary, such as Iceland, and Austria.
333
 This analysis argues that the Kurdistan region 
current arrangement is a hybrid parliamentary system which has some elements of semi-
presidentialism. 
 Further, Elgie defines the semi-presidential as “the situation where a popularly elected, 
fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to a 
parliament”. 334  He argues that if the system loses the fixed-term condition of a president or the 
responsibility a government to parliament, this system cannot be considered as semi-
presidential.
335
 Additionally, Elgie claims that in the system that “the president would appear to 
                                                 
330 See Ayelet Banai, From Presence To Action: Political Representation And Democracy In Iraqi Kurdistan, 48 
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Assumptions, 33 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 219, 221-222 (1998).  
 
335 Robert Elgie, supra note 75, at 2-3.  
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be responsible to the legislatures… [t]his would violate the fixed-term president requirement and 
would mean that the country should not be classed as semi-presidential”.336 In KR, although the 
president is elected by direct vote, the Parliament has the capacity to remove the President by 
vote non-confidence. In the other words, the survival of President in office depends on the 
confidence of three-fourths of the MPs. It means that the president could be removed over policy 
controversies between the parliament and president. Therefore, it lost the first conditions of the 
fixed-term president. 
337
 Consequently, KR’s system cannot be characterized as semi-presidential 
or presidential system.  
 Elgie also contends that the responsibility of the government (council of minister and 
minister) means that the government needs the legislatures’ confidence to survive. Also, he 
excludes the condition that the legislature can pass a vote of confidence, but it cannot exercise 
the vote of non-confidence against the government as he called “one-shot game.”338 In Kurdistan 
region, although the parliament has the power to pass a vote of no-confidence by two-thirds of 
the members of the parliament, the President has discretionary powers over implementation of 
the  no-confidence vote.
339
 It means that even if the parliament passes the vote of non-confidence 
                                                 
336 Id at 4. 
337 See Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination, 26 
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 198, 203 (1993).  
338 Robert Elgie, supra note 75, at 4. 
339 Article 10, Section 13, Presidency Law No.1 of 2005(Kurdistan Region-Iraq) (This section stated that “when the 
parliament pass vote non-confidence against the prime minister and minister, the president approve their 
resignations through decree.”); E.g, If one compares the language KR’s vote non-confidence with France 
constitution, which directly does not contain any explicit language in term prerogative power over vote non-
confidence. Nevertheless, Charles de Gaulle read article 8 of France constitution as he argued that this his reserve 
power to accept or to refuse the prime minister resignation after vote non-confidence. He was able to retain his 
Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, for 8 months out of the parliament’s confidence. Also, the government of the 
prime minister was not care-taker government. The second precedent after the de Gaulle’s interpretation does not 
exit. Nevertheless, the constitutional scholars argue this was a violation of constitution. See article 8, section 1 of 
France constitution. (“The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He terminates that appointment 
when the latter tenders the resignation of the Government.”); See also Article 53, Section 1of France constitution. 
(“If the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure, or rejects the Government's program or a general policy 
statement by the latter, the Prime Minister must tender the Government's resignation to the President of the 
 
 54 
 
to remove the government, the president has the implicit power to refuse by not issuing the 
presidential decree to implement the will of the Parliament.
340
 For instance in South Korea, the 
Parliament can recommend the dismissal of the government, but the president retains the 
discretionary power whether to accept or to refuse the parliament recommendation.
341
 
 
Moreover, if one attempts to measure KR’s form of government with different 
classifications, he or she finds the Cheibub classification useful with regard to the hybrid 
constitutional system. Cheibub outlines presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-
presidentialism based on checks and balance mechanisms by examining the interactions between 
“the government, the assembly, and (where they exist) elected presidents.”342 The departure 
point is that “whether the government can be removed by the assembly in the course of its 
constitutional term in office” by “the vote of confidence” or “failed vote of confidence” or 
                                                                                                                                                             
Republic.”); See ANDREW KNAPP, VINCENT WRIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE 60 (2006). In 
KR, the language of Presidency Law and draft constitution contain many of these discretionary powers via decree, 
which is not the regulatory decree based on the statutes, but  the decrees are substantial part of finalizing the process 
of vote non-confidence. These decrees are actually empowers the president directly to have discretionary power. For 
instance, the executing capital punishment and pardon cannot be enforced without president’s decree because they 
are two prerogative power of president under current structure of Kurdistan region. 
340 See MARGIT TAVITS, supra note 303, at 13 (The direct election of president in Kurdistan Region allows president 
to have more politically active in term of using his constitutional powers because the direct elections allows the 
president different legitimacy from parliament legitimacy and there are likely to have different behaviors would not 
please government or parliament. Then, if the draft constitution of KR permit drastic interpretation and vague 
clauses. The result would be catastrophic for democracy.). 
341 Robert Elgie, supra note 75, at 5. 
342CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 34. 
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dismissal powers by the elected president.
343
 If a legislature does not have the authority to 
remove the government collectively, 
344
 the system can be identified as a presidential system. If 
the legislature exclusively has the power to remove the government collectively, it is the 
parliamentary system. Moreover, the system that empower the legislature to remove the 
government collectively without removing the elected president while having “considerable 
powers” is semi-presidential system.345 
According to Cheibub classifications, although the Israeli prime ministers was elected by 
a direct vote from 1991 to 2001, the prime minister and his or her cabinet could be removed 
through a no-confidence vote by the parliament. Thus, the Israeli form of government is 
classified as parliamentary. In Switzerland and Bolivia, 
346
 the government collectively is elected 
by the legislatures, but the government preserves a fixed mandate, and the existence of 
government does not depend on the legislature. Therefore, the legislature are disempowered to 
remove the government. Cheibub classifies these two countries as presidential systems.
347
 
Further, Cheibub argues that the rigidity of using the vote of confidence does not impact the 
classification’s general lines.348 For instance, “the 1996 Ukrainian constitution” stipulated that 
the legislature can exercise the vote of no-confidence “only once in each of the two annual 
                                                 
343 Id at 34. 
344 Id at 37. 
345 Semi-persenenilaism also have the different form in which allows concurrent powers to the legislature and the 
elected president to remove the government collectively. Moreover, the elected president could directly dismiss the 
government collectively or partially, or sometimes the president has power of dissolving the legislatures that 
indirectly makes the government to lose the parliament confidence. In this case, the new election should be held to 
assembly in order to form the new government. See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 38. 
346 Shugart and Carry define these two countries as Independent-assembly system. Nevertheless, Cheibub defines 
them as presidential according to his classification. See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, supra note 
293, at 84; See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 35-36. 
347  CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 36. 
348 Id. 
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legislative sessions.”349 Likewise, the Russian constitution stipulated that the Duma must pass a 
vote of no-confidence “twice within three months” before the legislatures and government can be 
dismissed by the president.
350
 
Returning to Kurdistan Region form of government, using both the Cheibub and Elgie 
definitions, the Kurdish system is a hybrid parliamentary which has some elements of semi-
presidentialism. Both government and president can be removed in the leeway because if the 
president refuses a no-confidence vote against the government, the Parliament can remove the 
President by a no-confidence vote.
351
 Once the president is removed from office, the speaker of 
the Parliament can exercise the power of the president during 60 days while preparations for a 
new election are made.
352
 The speaker can exercise all the powers of the President in issuing 
decrees during that 60 days.
353
 In other words, although the government is not exclusively 
responsible to parliament in a narrow sense, both president and government are politically 
accountable to parliament in a broad sense. It means both of them could be altered, and this 
opportunity for alteration, which parliament has, cannot be found under presidentialism or semi-
presidentialism.
354
 Althought the President is not politically accountable in parliamentary 
systems due to his or her marginlized role and counter-signature of prime minister, some 
                                                 
349 Id. 
350 Id at 37. 
351 Cheibub argues the rigidity on vote non-confidence should not affect the general lines of his definition. Thus, 
according of Cheibub argument, using vote non-confidence by third-fourth in Kurdistan region should not be 
construed as to affect the parliamentary model. See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 37. 
352 Presidency Law No. 1 of 2005 
353 Article 15, Presidency Law No.1 of 2005 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
354 See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 37. 
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parliamentary countries allow for the political accountability of presidents such as exist in 
Latvia, Isreal, Iceland, Austria, Lithuania.
355
  
 Nevertheless, the KR form of government retains some elements of semi-presidential 
systems such as the dual executive and shared powers between the president and prime 
minister.
356
 The president exerts veto overs the parliament’s legislating process (which can be 
overridden by simple majority), the power of conducting foreign affairs, and national defense- 
because the president is commander in chief.
357
 The president possesses broad powers of 
appointing judges, the general attorney, the chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council 
(KRSC),
358
 and affirming and issuing the decree for the governors…etc.359 
Concerning the form of government under the draft constitution, although article 1 of 
the draft constitution states that the KR is a parliamentary system, this analysis argues that the 
draft constitution embraced the presidential system. Under the draft, the president possesses the 
fixed-mandate, and the only way to remove the president is impeachment which is different from 
existing structures of KR.
360
 The parliament can only hold a no-confidence vote for the 
government, it cannot, however, utilize it against the government without the president’s 
approval.
361
 If one applies the Elige analysis to the KR form of government under the draft 
                                                 
355 See KRZYSZTOF PROKOP, EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SELECTED STATES OF CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE 106 (2010). 
356 See Article 3 & Article 13 of Presidency Law No.1 of 2005 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq); See also MATTHEW SOBERG 
SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, supra note 293, at 23-26. 
357 Article 13, Section 1, Presidency Law no 1 of 2005 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
358 Article 10, Presidency Law No 1 of 2005 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). See also Article 4 section 1, Law of Security 
Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
359 Article 18, section 3, Kurdistan Region Law of the governorates No 3 of 2009 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq).  
360 See article 53, Section 4, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 
2009 
361 See article 65, Section 15, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 
2009 (“Release a decree accepting the resignation of the government or of a Minster after has passed a motion of a 
no-confidence in either or them.”). 
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constitution, the president acquires the fixed-term, but the survival of government does not 
depend on the parliament. Therefore, the government no-confidence vote is a “one-shot game” as 
in the example of South Korea where the parliament after passing no-confidence to the 
government,
362
 cannot enforce the vote no-confidence without the president’s approval.363 Also 
according to the Cheibub classification, the KR form of government under draft is presidential 
since the parliament can not remove the government. 
 
2.3.2 Enforcement phase and answerability phase of accountability under existing structures 
and draft constitutions 
Under existing structures, the mechanism of accountability in both phases of 
answerability and enforcement is different to the president and the government. The mechanisms 
of accountability against a president do not have the answerability phase although no-confidence 
                                                 
362 Robert Elgie, supra note 75, at 4. 
363 Cf., e.g., Robert Elgie elaborates the Uzbekistan constitution which contain same discretionary power of the 
president over vote non-confidence. Concerning Uzbekistan, He states that “The vote of non-confidence in the PM 
[Prime Minister] shall be deemed adopted if it receives a vote of at least two-thirds of the lower chamber and the 
upper house of the Uzbek parliament, respectively. In this case the president decides on the release of the PM from 
office. The entire composition of the Cabinet of Ministers resigns together with the PM.” Thus, he argues this 
feature excludes the Uzbekistan from semi-presidential, and it becomes more close to presidential. See Robert Elgie, 
‘Difficult’ cases – Uzbekistan, (Last visited June.26,2015), available at 
http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?cat=72. 
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votes require daily questioning because the vote implies that the president should act as the agent 
of the parliament. Yet, the parliament does not have the committee to oversee the president’s 
actions in order to make sure to what extent the president’s actions are consistent with the will of 
parliament. Further, the Parliament by law did not have the power to allow a member of the 
parliament to hold an inquiry on the president’s actions. Presumably, the parliament has only the  
three-fourths majority no-confidence vote as a tool of enforcement. Because of the super 
majority required to trigger this tool, it is effectively impossible to use. 
The enforcement phase against the government and ministers is even more problematic 
because voting out the government would entail escalating enforcement processes. For instance, 
if the parliament votes out the government by two-thirds and the president does not approve, the 
parliament would have to vote the president out by three-fourths. It means that this back and 
forth in the procedures tend to incentivize the prime ministers act in a way to ensure the 
president supports him or her. Under draft constitution, voting out the prime minister could be 
blocked by the president. Presumably, changing the president is difficult in both theoretical 
framework of impeachment subject-matter jurisdiction and the process in the draft.
364
 Even if the 
parliament impeaches the president by two-thirds, the trial of the president would be in 
constitutional court.  The verdict against a president should be passed by supermajority of the 
constitutional court.
365
 
                                                 
364 Article 62, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009 (“ If the 
President of the Region, or the Vice President, is impeached by a vote of a majority of two-thirds of the Members of 
Parliament on account of perjury of the constitutional oath, serious violation of the Constitution, or high treason, and 
is then found guilty by the Region's Constitutional Court, he shall be removed from his position.”). 
365 See Article 95, Section 6, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 
2009 (“Try the President or Vice President of the Kurdistan Region after they have been impeached by the 
Parliament in accordance with Article 62 of this Constitution. The conviction of the President or the Vice President 
requires the agreement of at least five of the Court's members.”). 
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In KR, the legal clauses of answerability with respect to the questioning process and 
committee oversight offer the government and ministers more leeway to not provide information 
or be accountable to the parliament. For instance, the questioning process is divided by two 
categories the written questions and oral questions. If the prime minister or ministers do not 
respond to the questions, the member of the parliament can trigger an interrogations process, but 
the prime ministers and ministers must consent to interrogations and to appear in the main 
chambers.
366
 Thus, if the prime minister and ministers do not appear in the interrogation 
sessions, legislators are powerless to pass a motion for a no-confidence vote.  Additionally, the 
interrogation of the prime minister focuses on political questions. Consequently, the judiciary 
cannot interfere to force the prime ministers and ministers to be present in the main chamber.  
In KR, although the committees are gatekeepers of the main chamber in creating policies 
and providing oversite of the ministers in respect to their jurisdictions, these committees tend not 
functions when the same majority controls the government ministers, parliament presidium, and 
the chairman of these committees.
367
 Consequently, when that majority has strong party 
discipline, these committees tend to do no oversight on government actions or their senior 
leaders in the executive. Generally, chairing these committees is very important to the political 
opposition, but in KR, the same majority that forms the government and constitute the presidium 
can deprive opposition from chairing important committees such as the legal committee,
368
 
                                                 
366 Article 69 & 70, Parliament By-law No.1 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
367 See official website of Kurdistan Parliament (Last visited, June.26, 2015), 
http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?page=committees&c=Committees-Permanant2009 
368 E.g., the legal committee is very crucial because it formalize and drafts polices of all others committees. Without 
legal committee’s screening, it is not possible for any polices to reach main chamber. 
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finance affairs committee,
369
 Consequently, depriving these committees form political opposition 
creates an inactive parliament.  
2.4 Undermining the political accountability of both the council of ministers and parliament 
by Kurdistan Region’s Security Council under draft constitutions and existing structures: 
Under the draft constitution and existing structure, 
370
 the Kurdistan Region’s Security 
Council possesses overlapping jurisdictions with both legislating role of parliament and 
executive role of the council of ministers.
371
 The Kurdistan Region’s Security Council (KRSC) is 
the executive and legislative body which has the broad’s capacity of creating law, regulations, 
and executing laws under supervision of the president.
372
 It has far more flexible jurisdiction 
over information security, economics security, foods security, energy security and organized 
crimes…etc. This council is a protector of the constitution and laws of the regions.373 The 
President supervises this council, and it is headed by the chancellor.
374
 Moreover, the president is 
able to add any members of the government including ministers and prime ministers to order 
them under the council formations.
375
 The permanent members of this council are the director of 
the security agency, the director of general department of the military secret services, the 
                                                 
369 E.g., the committee of finance directly oversight the spending process of a finance minister. 
370 E.g., Article 109, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009 
(“A Council called ‘The Council of the Region’s Security’ shall be formed. This Council shall be linked to the 
President of the Region. The powers and duties of this Council shall be regulated by the law.”); See also Law of 
Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq) 
371 See Article 3, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
372 See Article 5, Section 2, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq); See 
also article 2, section  1&2 Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
373 See article 3, Section 2, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
374 See Article 2, Section 1& 2, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
375 See Article 4, Section 2, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011(Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
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directors of the intelligence agency (Dazgay Zanyari which is secrete services of PUK) and 
protection agency (Azhanci Parastin which is secret services of KDP).
376
  
Furthermore, the Law of Kurdistan Region Security Council (LKRSC) No.4 of 2011 
empowers both president and KRSC to exercise broad discretionary powers over determining the 
content of above-mentioned jurisdictions and terminologies. LKRSC does not define these 
jurisdictions precisely, and it does not specify to what extent it may be applied.  For instance, 
protecting the constitution and laws of regions under LKRSC may entail interventions in 
parliament’s duties or against its ministers. In an extreme case, KRSC may use its broad 
discretion to subvert the political system under pretext of protecting the constitution such as a 
similar National Security Council did under pretext of protecting constitution and secular system 
in Turkey.
377
 Likewise, the “economic security” could entail corporate regulations, tax 
regulations, rules on oil income, and commerce. As long as these terminologies are not defined, 
LKRSC could involve very broad implications.
378
 
KRSC can undercut the agency of the parliament and its political accountability to 
voters-vertical accountability- because KRSC can substitute the parliament in creating laws and 
                                                 
376On the duty of National security and its neutrality, Kamal Chomani stated that “[w]e do not have national 
security, but two family securities.” See Kamal Chomani & Jake Hess, Pro-Democracy Demonstrations In Northern 
Iraq/South Kurdistan, OPEN DEMOCRACY (2 March 2011), https://www.opendemocracy.net/kamal-chomani-jake-
hess/pro-democracy-demonstrations-in-northern-iraqsouth-kurdistan; 
 See article 2, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011; See also DENNIS P. CHAPMAN, SECURITY 
FORCES OF THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, 204-206(2009).  
377 In Turkey, National Security Council often was utilized to undermine political process under pretext of protecting 
political and constitutional orders of Turkey. See Ümit Cizre & Menderes Çınar ,Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, 
And Politics In The Light Of The February 28 Process, 102 The South Atlantic Quarterly 309,(2003)  
and: See also  ERGUN ÖZBUDUN ,THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF TURKEY: 1876 TO THE PRESENT,15-17(2011); 
See also Ümit Cizre, Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey, 57 MIDDLE EAST 
JOURNAL 213, 215(2003) 
378  E.g., the first chapter of the Law of Kurdistan Region Security Council No.4 of 2011 does not include any 
definitions for these terminologies. Usually, any statute, which passed by the parliament, defines legal terminologies 
in order to eliminate drastic interpretations. 
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policies in above-mentioned jurisdictions.
379
 Additionally, KRSC is a parallel executive that can 
carry out the government duties (council of minister and ministers’ duties) without having to be 
accountable or answerable to the parliament -undercutting the horizontal accountability between 
executive and parliament. It directly undermines the principal-agent relation and political 
accountability between the parliament and executive (council of ministers) under parliamentary 
formula.
380
 KRSC can perform the executive duties of government without being the agent of the 
parliament, and the parliament cannot provide oversight of it.
381
 Furthermore, the president can 
utilize the KRSC council to abrogate the power of the council of ministers and its agency which 
is, to some degree, answerable to the majority of the parliament in KR.  
The KRSC is not compatible with the presidential formula in terms of principal-agent 
relations and political accountability.
382
  Under presidentialism, it is true that the president is not 
the agent of the legislature, but the secretaries and civil servants under the president are subject 
to oversight of multiple competing principals, namely the lower house and upper house.
383
 
Besides, under the presidential formula, the bureaucrats under the president are not immunized 
from judicial review (sanctioning actors),
384
 but the KRSC is immunized from the court’s review 
because legal processing against KRSC requires the president’s consent to waive immunity.385   
 
                                                 
379 See Article 3, Law of Security Council of Kurdistan Region No.4 of 2011. 
380See Keith Dowding & Patrick Dumont, Agency Rent Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard, In THE SELECTION OF 
MINISTERS AROUND THE WORLD 1, 1-3(Keith Dowding et al., eds.,2014). 
381 The parliament by-law does not contains any legal provisions to allow sending questions or inquiries about the 
duties of KRSC.  
382 See Kaare Strøm, supra note 297, at 267-269. 
383 Id. 
384Id.  
385Accord, Article 16, Section 1, Presidency Law No.1 of 2005(Kurdistan Region-Iraq); Accord, Article 16, Section 
1, Council of Consultations Law No.14 of 2008 (Kurdistan region) (The president's actions are immunized from 
judicial review. Also, the ordinary court including civil and criminal court cannot proceed legal actions in terms of 
criminal accountability.). 
 64 
 
This graph is created based on Kaare Strøm Model for political accountability and chain of delegations 
between principal and agent under presidential and parliamentary government.
386
 
 
 
2.5 Manipulating the sovereignty of parliament to reduce political accountability of 
government and executive 
In KR, the legal system is not entrench.  Due to a lack of constitution, parliament can 
change any laws or any institution as it wishes by simple majority of MPs
387
 This includes the 
                                                 
386 See Kaare Strøm, supra note 297, fig 1, at 269.  
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bill of rights and constitutional court (judicial review to scrutinize the parliament’s action) under 
existing structures. This flexibility allows the majority more powers without restraints. 
Unfortunately, this majority uses its influence to reduce accountability of government.
388
 Thus, 
under existing structures, the Parliament has been pressured and manipulated to reduce its 
control over the executive from 1992-2013.
389
 As a result, any political deal with the support of 
the majority can be transformed to law without any restrictions. In other words, any political deal 
despite its content if approved by parliament becomes a “de facto constitution” due to lack of 
written constitution.
390
 This flexibility only exists under current structures, but it does not stop 
being an issue under the draft constitution. This is because once the draft is ratified-in general 
referendum, the supremacy of constitution is prevailing principle over sovereignty of 
parliament.
391
 Consequently, the draft constitution would constitutionalize the defects of political 
accountabilities that were mentioned before.
392
 
The sovereignty of the parliament (supremacy of parliament) is related with the first 
moment of creating the Kurdistan national assembly (the parliament).  As has been clarified in 
the first chapter, the seven political leaders signed the first laws which are the Kurdistan National 
Assembly law (KNAL). Then, all the others institutions- council of ministers, the presidency- 
                                                                                                                                                             
387 See Article 75, Section 1, Parliament By-law No.1 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
388 See Kamal Chomani, Kurdish Region no Longer Possesses a Legal President, WORLD BULLETIN (12:42, 02 July 
2013 Tuesday), http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/112280/kurdish-region-no-longer-possesses-a-legal-president 
389 On manipulating power of the parliament and political deal, Mariwan Wrya and Aras Fatah stated in their 
opinion that “Kurdish politics is a dark politics and what’s present in this darkness is conspiracies and underground 
agreements for secretly distributing power, not debates and open dialogues. This is a kind of blind conflict over 
power and only directs hate and social disasters.” See Kamal Chomani, Kurdish region no longer possesses a legal 
president, WORLD BULLETIN (12:42, 02 July 2013 Tuesday), http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/112280/kurdish-
region-no-longer-possesses-a-legal-president 
390 GARETH R. V. STANSFIELD, supra note 66, at 129. 
391 See Article 3, Section 1, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 
2009 
392 See Michael Skold, The Reform Act's Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial Review in the United 
Kingdom?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2149, 2179-2180(2007); See also Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative 
Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 5-6(2001). 
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were created and designed by a simple majority of the parliament.
393
 The first law (KNAL) has 
been amended by the simple majority of the parliament several times by same usual procedures 
of any other laws.
394
 All statutes of the parliaments are not entrenched and can be amended by 
simple majority. Each parliament’s term possesses the same amount of powers of its 
preceders.
395
 These features can appropriately characterized as parliament sovereignty or 
legislative supremacy allowing the legislature to “make or unmake any laws” by the simple 
majority of its members.
396
 
 Under existing structures, the mechanism of political accountability does not have an 
entrenched nature to create, guarantee and preserve the right of political opposition or minority 
groups of society’s rights. As the parliament does not have sufficient autonomy or political will, 
the party leader’s control of the parliament and the country’s flexible legal structures, in context 
of KR, create a real threat that the power of the executive will be expanded and the mechanisms 
of accountability will be eroded.  The quality of political parties affects the quality of democracy 
in KR due to the sovereignty of parliament and flexible structure. Often, this power of 
Parliament is manipulated to political ends. For instance, the extension of presidential term limits 
                                                 
393 See those laws which have been enacted since1992 (last visited June.28, 2015), available at 
http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?page=byyear&c=LDD-Yasa. 
394 Weill explains three fundamental condition of parliamentary sovereignty which all of these condition exist in 
Kurdistan Region legal system: “(1) that parliament may enact any statute except one that restricts its successors; (2) 
that constitutional law is on par with regular law and may be enacted or amended like any other statute; and (3) that 
no judicial review power over primary legislation is granted to the courts.” See Rivka Weill, Reconciling 
Parliamentary Sovereignty And Judicial Review: On The Theoretical And Historical Origins Of The Israeli 
Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 457(2012). See also Joshua Segev, Who Needs a 
Constitution? In Defense of the Non-Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel, 70 ALB. L. REV. 409,425-
426(2007). 
395 See Article 75, Section 1, Parliament By-law No.1 of 1992 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq). 
396 See Lori Ringhand, Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: Debating Judicial Review in 
Britain, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 865, at 876 & 872-874(2005); See also Stephen Gardbaum, The New 
Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707,711-716(2011). 
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was made by the parliament.
397
 The Parliament amended the article that include term limit 
implicitly by extending it for two years.
398
 It is also true for the KRSC, by parliament’s decree 
some legislating powers were shifted to this council.
399
 Since the written constitution, bill of 
rights and constitutional court do not yet exist, the tamed majority of parliament can be a real 
threat to accountability mechanisms in KR.  
2.6 The political will of the parliament in exerting its powers: 
Although many design defects are explained, the inactivity of the parliament and its 
marginalized role in political arena needs more substantial understanding. In KR, the horizontal 
accountability does not function, and the parliament cannot check the executives.
400
 The reasons 
of ineffectiveness of the parliament relate to de facto autonomy of the Kurdistan parliament.
401
 
The Kurdistan parliament often is labeled as a rubber stamp parliament which legitimatizes the 
political decisions that have been made outside of its chamber.
402
 The actual political 
deliberations and decision-making process are outside of the parliament and located in backdoor 
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http://www.stripes.com/news/in-iraq-s-kurdistan-tension-before-the-vote-1.93525. 
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meetings.
403
 On the contrary, the political accountability requires “open discussion and debate 
about matters of public interest.”404 The political accountability is the process of dialog among 
political parties in the public sphere.
405
 The explaining and justifying of the agent to principal are 
dialogical process which cannot be observed in KR between executive (government and 
president) and parliament.
406
 
The de facto autonomy or the political will of the parliament, which is undermined by the 
political party leaders, is the missing element of horizontal accountability.
407
 The political party 
leaders have ample capacity to influence government functions and parliament decision-making 
without holding public positions (Ministers, MPs, chief whips, and head of factions).
408
 The 
party leaders’ hegemony is supported by many factors including but not limited to, client-patron 
relationship,
409
 mass party structures, the party discipline, the electoral design. Relatively 
speaking, these factors disincentives the party leaderships from participating in the government 
and incentivizes instead them to direct their members through parliament or government 
structures. Also, these factors allow party leaders to have ample room to place the responsibility 
fir government wrongdoing on other’s shoulders while the major decision have been dictated by 
them. It is worthy to observe these factors are interrelated not isolated from each other. To 
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%20Assessing%20the%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Iraqi%20Kurdistan.pdf. 
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correlate these aforementioned factors with the parliament weakness is central to decision-
making and to hold government accountable, the following analysis talks about the 
interconnectivity of these factors.  
Concerning the client-patron relationships, the parties’ leaders exert considerable 
powers by patronizing both parliament and government in KR. Patronizing the executive and 
parliament informally and indirectly have eroded the horizontal accountability (checks and 
balance).
410
 The common trend is that ministers and MPs are chosen among close association, 
relatives, and family members of the party leadership.
411
 Consequently, the parliament tends to 
not interrogate the government. For instance, since 1992, the parliament has not voted out any 
government cabinet or dismissed the ministers despite all the corruptions and wrongdoings in 
governmental positions.
412
 Additionally, the method of forming government and the cabinet 
which does not require elections for ministers or prime ministers enables the leadership to bypass 
voters to mechanically fill the executive’s positions. On that point in KR, Sardar Aziz argues; 
Party leaders never run for seats in parliament. Although the governing system in the 
KRG is nominally parliamentarian, neither the ministers nor the prime minister are 
members of parliament. Therefore, the Kurdish political elite is not composed of current 
MP’s, mostly due to the insignificant role played by parliament within the governing 
system in the KRG.
413
    
                                                 
410 See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HC 564 - UK GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ 26 (2014); See also DIANE E. KING, KURDISTAN ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: KINSHIP, 
LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN IRAQ 213 (2013); See also TAIABUR RAHMAN, PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL AND 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANGLADESH, INDIA AND SRI 
LANKA 17-18 (2007); See also Herbert Kitschelt & Steven I. Wilkinson, Citizen–Politician Linkages: An 
Introduction, IN PATRONS, CLIENTS AND POLICIES: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL 
COMPETITION, 7-8&23 (Herbert Kitschelt, et al, eds., 2007). 
411 Serhat Erkmen, supra note 408, at 86-87. 
412See Kamal Chomani, Iraqi Kurdistan’s Historic Election, FOREIGN POLICY (September 28, 2013), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/28/iraqi-kurdistans-historic-election/. 
413 Sardar Aziz, The Kurdistan Regional Government Elections: A Critical Evaluation, 16 INSIGHT TURKEY 67, 69 
(2014). 
 70 
 
Moreover, proportional representation’s relatively closed-list, to some extent, endows the leaders 
of political party to fill the parliament’s seats with their patronage networks.414 
Generally speaking, the patronage network around the party leaders receives advantages 
from implementing policies from ministers and governmental positions.
415
 To some extent and 
relatively speaking, the key decision-making positions in the executive attracts some of these 
leaders to participate in government to feed these patronage networks which are sustained by 
favoring the members of their network from policies implementations.
416
 For instance, Massoud 
Barzani is the president of KDP and president of KRG. Nechirvan Barzani is the prime minister 
of KRG and nephew of president Barzani. Nechirvan Barzani also is the deputy of president 
Barzani in KDP.
417
 Masrour Barzani, son of president Barzani, is chancellor of KRSC- members 
of KRD leaderships committee and politburo…etc.418  
Correspondingly, it could be argued that inadequacy of accountability mechanisms to 
hold these potions responsible is an attractive part of these key executive positions because the 
presidential candidate is elected by a majority popular vote.
419
 Removing the president from 
office, nevertheless, requires three-fourths of MPs by vote of no-confidence, and even under the 
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draft constitution impeachment requires a two-third vote and a super majority of the 
constitutional court. The prime minister receives a vote of confidence by a majority of the 
members of the parliament and vote of non-confidence requires two-thirds with the potential for 
a presidential veto through decree power. The chancellor of KRSC is not accountable to the 
council of ministers, parliament, or the courts because the chancellor is only accountable to the 
president under current structures and draft constitution.  
Thus, MP’s cannot exercise the horizontal accountability because of undue influence of 
this patronized process in KR. Even if the MPs of a particular party dissent from their leadership 
in the executive, they cannot vote them out due to the high threshold of enforcement phase of 
political accountability which is not congruent with political reality. For example, between 2005-
2013, presumably, the PUK and KDP formed a government by majority. If PUK or KDP wants 
to vote the government out, the voting out requires the KDP’s MPs and PUK’s MPs plus a third 
partner including Goran and KIU in order to reach the two-third majority. In the other words, 
once two political parties create a coalition agreement in KR, they no longer have ultimate power 
on their coalitions agreement due to third partner consent. Therefore, it cloud be argued that the 
Prime minister or government generally have a tendency to not take parliament into 
considerations because of patronizing of MPs and the high threshold on enforcement of political 
accountability.  
Concerning mass party in KR, Max Weber rationalizes the fear of mass party that leads 
to the “bureaucratization” of a political party.420  Ultimately, it would render “political 
accountability” and “representations”.421 Hence, Johan Stuart Mill argues that the mass party 
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would take autonomy from the MPs. Eventually, it creates the parliament that cannot check the 
executive.
422
 Unfortunately, the mass party in Kurdistan region is predominate theme nowadays. 
In addition to patronage process, the mass party endows the party leaderships to direct the 
parliament without being involved in public positions and without direct accountability in KR. 
In a mass party, the party leadership possesses the extra-parliamentary organizations to 
direct its ministers and members of the parliament. Based on the Katz and Mair’s analysis for the 
political parties, the KR political parties are mass parties in respect to their formation and 
internal organization.
423
  By scrutinizing the interactions between the political party on the 
ground (the members of the party), the political party in central office (politburos and leadership 
committee), and the political party in the public office (ministers and MPs),
424
 one can observe 
the strength of the party leadership in ruling parliament and government without direct 
involvement in KR. The mass party is defined as party that has a congress or conference in 
which the members of the party delegate power to a central office as their agent to hold the party 
members in the public office responsible towards the members of the party on the ground.
425
  
 The mass party has been a common model in Iraq since mid-twentieth century due to the 
impact of the socialist movement on the Middle East generally.
426
 The mass party was a common 
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model to deal with the revolutionary movements because it has the capacity to deal with vast 
territories.
427
 In addition to ideological and political impact of Soviet Union on Kurdistan 
generally,
428
 the hierarchy in mass parties and chain of command needed were compatible 
elements with organizing military units into political parties, 
429
 and helped organize partisan 
activities and insurgency activities against the Iraqi regime. Generally, the main Kurdish political 
parties did not emerge inside parliament or government institutions, but rather they emerged as a 
consequence of Iraqi regime atrocities and repression or some of them emerge outside of 
government institution.  
 Hence, the mass party model organized itself between party member in the central office 
and party members on the ground. Some Kurdish political parties have acquired public office 
since 1991-emerging autonomy in KR- such as KDP and PUK…Etc. Moreover, there are some 
significant political parties that emerged after 1991 such as KIU and Goran movement.  It should 
be observed that KIU is founded in 1996 and did not participate in the government during the 
two administrations period until 2005.
430
 In 1996-2005, KIU organized itself only between the 
party members on the ground and the party members in central office. It did not have members in 
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the public office until 2005. It is also true for KIG.
431
  Goran movement was founded in 2009 , 
and most of their leadership was comprised of PUK members in the politburo and committee 
leaderships. Nevertheless, it is a mass party due to the fact that members on the ground vote for 
upper levels of the party ranks.
432
 Also, the central office is regulating the interaction between 
the party member in public office and party members on the ground. The decision-making 
processes of Goran rests in its central office (Jevati Geshti).
433
  
Generally, the degree of independency of MPs vis-à-vis the party leadership control 
varies from one political party to another, but the common feature is that these MPs do not have 
the power to make major decision such us revoking the coalition agreement or voting out 
government-exerting the enforcement phase of political accountability. There is a margin in 
which MPs possess some level of independency, but this margin is not sufficient to restrain the 
executive. This marginalizes the role of MPs and affects the reputation of the Parliament towards 
public and voters.
434
  
In KR, the parliament exercises its power on the margin of the parties leaderships’ 
hegemony. Often, the executive members including (president, prime ministers and ministers) 
hold meetings with party leaders outside of parliament in closed-door sessions. After approving 
the major political decisions or reaching consensus, major political decisions obtain legal formats 
via the parliament. The dialogical process of political accountability does not take place between 
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prime minister and members of parliament.
435
 Generally, the public does not have detailed 
information about these meetings and decisions unless the content of these meeting is smuggled 
to the media. The executive actions with party leaders suggest that the actual decision makers are 
party leaders and not parliament.
436
 Thus, The controlling institution is the central office 
(Politburos and leaderships’ committee) which gives strength to the executive not the parliament 
because the survival of the executive are related with the extra-parliamentary decision–
makers(the central offices) that can exercise the enforcement phase of accountability. 
There are many examples to support the above argument, two come especially to mind. 
First,  there was discussions about the law of presidency in 2005, many members of the 
parliament stated that this law was decided by strategic agreement and the legislators’ duties are 
to formalize this agreement in legalist procedures to make this law better.
437
 A more recent 
example is the discussion surrounding extending the presidency and the draft of constitution. The 
president of Kurdistan region requested the parliament presidium discuss the draft with the party 
leaderships to take their positions.
438
 Ironically, this process backfired in term of political 
accountability and principal and agent relationships because the MPs receives support from 
voters to represent their interests in the parliament. The party leaders should discuss their issues 
inside parliament in transparent atmosphere. But in KR the Kurdistan parliament presidium is 
allowed to discuss the draft with the party leaders outside of the main chamber. The implicit 
meaning is that these MPs’ statements inside parliament do not represent the actual political will 
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of their party. These examples indicate the trend that the true power to decide on the nation’s fate 
resides with the parties’ leadership not the elected representatives of the people. 
In KR, the central offices (politburos and committee leaderships) are dominated or 
monopolized by strong personalities, insular groups, or families.
439
 The transition between the 
members of the party on the ground and central office reaches deadlock when the members on 
the ground no longer have capacity to alter the central office.
440
 It means even MPs inside their 
political party are disempowered to replace the members of central office.
441
 The central office 
with a firm hand holds the democratic cycle inside the political party. For instance, KDP from its 
foundations was ruled by Mustafa Barzani. After his death, Massoud Barzani, Son of Mustafa 
Barzani, became president of KDP until today. The Barzan tribe has dominated KDP’s 
leaderships.
442
 This is true for the PUK as well. Since its creations the party was led by Jalal 
Talabani until his illness which has caused disagreement among the party wings on whom to 
nominate for his positions as general secretary. Today, Talabani’s family dominates the PUK’s 
leadership despite the political tensions with other wings. In KIG, Ali Bapir has been the leader 
of KIG since its foundation. In respect to Goran, Nawshirwan Mustafa is the general organizer of 
Goran movement from inception until now.
443
 The only political party which transitioned from 
the founder was in KIU. In the general conference, Salahaddin Bahadin was replaced by the 
Mohammed Faraj in a peaceful manner.
444
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Concerning Electoral design and party discipline, the electoral design and party 
discipline serves to increase or decrease the political accountability of the executive (council of 
minister and ministers) towards the parliament.
445
 The electoral system’s design also creates a 
barrier for the members of legislature to oversee government and create an active, independant 
parliament.
446
  In systems where the electoral design is PR-closed-list,
447
 the political party tends 
to have strong discipline over their members in the parliament.
448
 Then, the strong party 
discipline tends to have negative affects on the parliament’s ability to enforce accountability over 
government.
449
  Also, some scholars argue that one national constituency and closed-list PR 
encourage the patronage process.
450
  
In addition, the electoral system and party discipline through nomination of candidates 
are related because the electoral system affects the way that the party leadership chooses the 
candidates.
451
 Moreover, the electoral system allocates the decision-making process inside 
political party in regards to choosing candidates.
452
 If the nomination of the candidates is for the 
national level and the electoral system is PR-closed-list, the party leaderships have more control 
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over choosing the candidate.
453
 The outcome of this design is that the leaderships can enforce 
more discipline by reducing the dissenting voice to their leaderships through filling 
nominations.
454
 The  increasing discipline overs the members of the parliament tends to 
disincentives the members of the parliament from utilizing the enforcement phase of 
accountability such as a no-confidence vote.
455
  
In contrast, when the electoral design enhances more local participation associated with 
local constituencies, the local grassroots of the party tend to have more control over candidates 
nomination rather than party leaderships.
456
 When the candidate has the local support and 
electoral design based on constituencies, the system tends to create the opportunity to the 
candidate to support local demands over party leaderships.
457
 It reduces the party discipline of 
the leadership overs the members of the parliaments. It creates incentives to dissent against the 
leadership’s policy and can lead to the executive ultimately being voted out of government.458 It 
also allows the candidate to legitimatize his or her position by having popular support at the local 
base in the face of party leadership.
459
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Before discussing political accountability in relation to party discipline, it is useful to 
distinguish the party cohesion and party discipline are often muddled by researchers. As Hazan 
argues “discipline starts where cohesion falters.”460 Party discipline means that the party’s 
leadership possesses “ways and means” to restrain and direct legislators, and legislators have 
obedience to follow the leadership directions contrary to their preferences.
461
 Conversely, Party 
cohesiveness means that the legislators of the particular faction work to achieve similar 
objectives based on their will and preferences.
462
 Thus, the cohesiveness is related with 
legislators’ preference over certain policies.463  
Moreover, when the political party enjoys strong discipline in the parliament, the 
members of the parliament refrain themselves from parliamentary investigations and no-
confidence votes against their senior leaders in the executive.
464
 Particularly when criticizing the 
party leaders in the executive may cause the members of the parliament to be expelled from the 
party line.
465
 Likewise, it may deprive the members of the parliament from futures career 
advancements or reelection opportunity.
466
 In KR, not only are MPs subject to disciplinary 
procedures of their party, but even ordinary members of the party can be subject to disciplinary 
punishment if he or she tries to criticize his or her leaderships.
467
  
                                                 
460 Reuven Y. Hazan, Does Cohesion Equal Discipline? Towards a Conceptual Delineation,  
9 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES1, 3(2003). 
461 Shaun Bowler et al., supra note 451, at 4. 
462
 JOHN M. CAREY, LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 126 (2009).  
463 Bjørn Erik Rasch, Electoral Systems, Parliamentary Committees, and Party Discipline: The Norwegian Storting 
in a Comparative Perspective, in In PARTY DISCIPLINE AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, 122 (Shaun Bowler et 
al.,eds.,1999). 
464 See TORILL MONSTAD, THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT: AN EVALUATION OF PARLIAMENT'S OVERSIGHT 
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466 Reuven Y. Hazan, supra note 460, at 5. 
467  Cf., Interview, PUK deputy leader: We Will Punish Party Members if They Speak Out Against PUK Leadership, 
KURDISH ASPECT (September 24, 2007), http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc092407KM.html;  
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The problem of electoral design in Kurdistan region allows strong party discipline which 
benefits the party leaders because the electoral system is relatively closed-list proportional 
representation and all Kurdistan region is considered as one constituency for all parliamentary 
seats.
468
 The parliament of Kurdistan region consists of 111 seats. A hundred general seats, 
which are built on PR-relatively closed list, are allocated for the entire region, and 11 reserved 
seats are for the ethnic minorities and has been divided into three categories. The Turkmen have 
five reserved seats based on PR-relatively closed list system. Chaldean, Syriac and Assyrian 
have five reserved seats based on PR-relatively closed list. Armenian have one reserved seat 
based on majority.  
Further, relatively closed list is defined as a system in which electors vote for the list is 
sufficient to consider the voting ticket as valid.
469
 The elector’s preference only changes the 
orders of the candidates who received the seats. In the other words, the each political party 
receives the seats based on the list votes. Then, the distributions of the seats among candidates of 
each party are based on the voter’s preferences. Presumably, if one political party receives three 
seats but no one votes for their candidates, these three seats are distributed based on the orders of 
the list. If the two candidates receive the same preference numbers of voters, the seat is allocated 
to the one who has priority in the list order. 
Strong party discipline, a centralized electoral system, a patronage network, and a lack 
of “intra-party democracy” under KR’s mass parties, erode mechanics of political 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also J. Scott Carpenter & Ahmed Ali, Iraqi Kurds Go to the Polls: Is Change Possible?, THE WASHINGTON 
INSTITUTE (July 23, 2009), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-kurds-go-to-the-polls-is-
change-possible  
468 See Michael Knights, 'Managed Democracy' Gives Way in Iraqi Kurdistan, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 
(August 3, 2009), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/managed-democracy-gives-way-in-iraqi-
kurdistan. 
469 Kris Deschouwer & Theo Jans, Electoral Systems And Their Effects In Divided Societies, In INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 161, 170 (Bertus De Villiers et al., eds., 1998). 
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accountability to restrain executive actions or to hold government accountable.
470
 Ultimately it 
reverses the relationships between the executive as agent to a principal and the parliament as 
principal to the agent. The available tools to exercise the political accountability against 
executive tends to not functions and the executive tends to accumulate powers and to act 
unaccountably in the absence of active parliament oversight. The members of the parliament are 
reluctant in exercising the accountability mechanism without approval of the central office. They 
are more inclined to fulfill the central office’s preferences rather than the voter’s.471  In policy-
making, MPs forward central office’s preferences over those of their voters.  
In KR, the central office almost always exercises the final words in choosing the 
candidates.
472
 For a candidate to be nominated it needs to be approved by central office. Further, 
due to the patronage network that party leaders have built around themselves, these candidacies 
tend to create more loyalty and accountability of both executive and parliament to party leaders 
generally rather towards voters and public. It is safe to assume the party leaders tend to 
participate in those governmental positions since there are few mechanism to uphold accountable 
while having substantial powers, or the party leaders do not participate in government in order to 
not be accountable at all because they possess substantial powers outside of governmental 
institutions via the mass party’s discipline powers and patronage network. Thus, as long as the 
true decision-making is outside of parliament and accumulated in extra-parliamentary structure. 
The parliament cannot have an effective role inside governmental structures.  
                                                 
470 See Ergun Özbudun, Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?, 7 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 123, 134-135 (1996). 
471 E.g., during the presidency crises, the MP’s of PUK preferred to do no extend the Barzani’s presidency. They 
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After meeting with their top leaderships, they agreed to vote for it. 
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Chapter III 
Introduction: 
Empowering the Kurdistan parliament requires a design that can at least mitigate those 
problems which are discussed under the design defects analysis and contextual factors analysis. 
The constitutional design is always about the “trade-off” among diverse factors.473 The strategy 
of this redesigning approach focuses on the incentives that design factors and contextual factors 
produce (see chapter two). Moreover,  proposed design changes should be correspond to the 
aforementioned issues of political accountability including the answerability phase and the 
enforcement phase. In addition, they should account for contextual factors like the political will 
of parliament, the mass party system, the party discipline, the patronage networks, and the 
electoral system. 
Moreover, this analysis proposes a design that can incentivize the party leaders to 
exercises their prerogative inside the parliament not through recruiting their patronage network 
to be ministers or members of the parliament. To bring back political deliberations and 
transparency, the design seeks to disempower the party leaderships in nomination processes, 
reducing the party discipline, reducing their capacity to tenuously control the parliament and 
executive, reducing their capacity over their grassroots in order to encourage the party leadership 
to take a more active role in public office as head of factions in the parliament or as prime 
minister and ministers. The analysis further argues that decreasing the influence of 
organizational powers of political parties and their discipline allows the members of the 
                                                 
473See Jon Elster, Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making, IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 15, 17 (Tom Ginsburg eds., 2012). 
 
 83 
 
parliament to utilize the answerability and enforcement phase of political accountability more 
actively.  
Further, to overcome the serious flaws of accountability in KR, this analysis claims the 
electoral system and form of government could be helpful tools to address the issues mentioned 
above. For the electoral design, the single transferable vote could have a vital impact in 
minimizing the party discipline and changing the formations of political parties. For the form of 
government, the constrained parliamentarism model is useful for reducing many issues 
surrounding executive accountability. In addition, these two responses will change the many 
various incentives. Finally, there are others considerations that must be dealt with such as the 
Kurdistan Region Security Council, and the sovereignty of the parliament.  
3.1 Electoral design concerning the party discipline, mass party, and the leadership’s control 
To empower the MP’s with independence and to allow the KR’s MPs to express their 
will and to be able to exercise the available tools of the answerability and enforcement phase of 
political accountability in the parliament, it is important to reduce the party discipline, the control 
of leadership and executive hegemony over the parliament.
474
 From a contextual factors analysis, 
enhancing the parliament capacity of government oversight requires the electoral system that can 
reduce party discipline, to allow formidable autonomy for MPs, and incentivises them to 
represent voters demands over their leadership’s. One has to analyze how the electoral system 
can impact on the party discipline and incentivise the MPs.  
                                                 
474 See Rustum Mahmoud, Arab Center for Research and Policies Studies, The Outlooks for the Opposition in 
Iraqi’s Kurdistan Region, 5 (2011), available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/71f049bc-8449-493b-9359-
1132781ca06e.pdf  
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The electoral system creates different forms of incentives for the member of the 
parliament and the party leaderships. Based on the MPs incentives and party discipline, the 
electoral system could be classified for the three types which are “party-centered systems”, 
“intermediate systems”, and “candidate-centered systems”.475  In the party-centered system, the 
electoral choice does not allow voters to have personal preferences over electing the candidate 
inside a list. The party leadership have high discipline over their MPs.
476
 Also, it discourages the 
members of parliament from seeking personal votes beyond the party line.
477
 In addition, the 
party leaderships possesses the high level of sanctioning and discipline over their MPs. For 
instance, the closed-list proportional representatiativs are determined by party leaderships and 
voters only have one vote for the list, not to the candidates.  
Some scholars argued that in closed-list PR the influential principal of the MPs are the 
party leaderships not the voters due to the intense centralized process of allocating powers to the 
party leaders. 
478
 Likewise, relatively closed-list is considered as a party-centered system.
479
 
Consequently, this design incentivizes highly regulated, centralized process in which the 
candidate is approved and nominated to parliament by leadership.
480
 Under this party-centered 
system, the candidates are encouraged to appeal to leaderships more than the voters and 
                                                 
475 Paul Mitchell, Voters and their representatives: Electoral Institutions and 
Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, 37 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 335, 342-343(2000). 
476 See DAVID COLETTO, A MATTER OF QUALITY? CANDIDATES IN CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS 16 (2010). 
477 Paul Mitchell, supra note 475. 
478 See R.Kent Weaver, Electoral rules and Party system in Federations, In FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL 
CLEAVAGES 227, 230-231(Ugo M. Amoretti et al., eds., 2004). 
479 See Ulrich Sieberer, Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis, 12 JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 150, 163(2006). 
480 Paul Mitchell, supra note 475, at 341.  
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grassroots of the party.
481
 The party leadership has the power to disqualify the member of 
parliament from pursuing reelection. 
 The intermediate system is defined as the electoral system that permits both “individual 
and party appeals and sanctions.” In the others words, both the grassroots of the party and the 
party leaderships can bar a member of the parliament from reelections. For instance, “single 
member simple plurality, alternative vote, and double-ballot” are examples of the intermediate 
system. These systems are based on “single member’s district” (SMD) constituencies. The 
candidate may utilizes the “party label” to collect votes or it may appeal to constituency to be 
more beholden to the constituency’s than the leadership.482 However, if one compares second 
intermediate systems with “candidate-centered systems”, he or she can observe that the third 
categories is more likely to induce intra-party competition even amongst candidates from a 
political party.
483
  
The candidate-centered systems include both “genuinely preferential (open) list and 
single transferable vote (STV) systems.” It is worthy to clarify that the genuinely preferential 
open list should not have “pre-ordained list” or “default order”. 484 Shugrat defines the open list 
as lists that “provided by parties are unranked and preference votes alone determine the order of 
election from a party’s list.”485 Yet, political party leaders can screen and disqualify those whom 
do not desire to be reelected because in the open-list initially is provided by political party,
486
 but 
the voter’s preference count solely to choose the candidate. To some extent, open-list decrees 
                                                 
481 See CEES VAN DER EIJK & MARK FRANKLIN, ELECTIONS AND VOTERS 121-122 (2009). 
482 Paul Mitchell, supra note 475, at 342. 
483
 Id at 342-343.  
484 Id at 342. 
485 Matthew Søberg Shugart, Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New 
Challenges Ahead, In THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 25, 42 (Michael Gallagher et al., eds., 2005). 
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party discipline because under the open-list the candidates have two principals: the party 
leaderships and the voters.
487
 Also, it escalates intra-party rivalries which decrease party 
discipline.
488
   
However, comparing the PR open-list to STV, STV allows the candidates to be elected 
based on voter’s preferences solely by ranking the candidates on the ballot despite the party’s 
label.
489
 STV further reduces the discipline power of party leaders because it retains intra-party 
competitions, and it encourages the voters to scrutinize the candidates in close distance because 
the voters tend to vote based on the quality of candidates rather than party line.
490
 STV 
encourages the candidate to differentiate themselves from other candidates.
491
 The electors have 
a tendency to vote for the candidates that appeal to him most not only to the party label.
492
 
Hence, the candidate not only has to appeal to the grassroots of his or her party to cultivate votes 
but also to seek for the votes beyond their members or party lines.
493
 Consequently, the 
candidates are more prone to create the “personal followers” on the local level.494 
In order to reduce the political parties’ discipline in KR, one should decentralize the 
candidate’s selections method and to build local constituencies for the MPs based on the STV 
due to aforementioned qualities that exist under PR-STV.
495
 Inducing strong relationships 
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between the MPs and the local branch of the political party in the local district is a significant 
factor to decrease the party discipline over the MPs.
496
 Also, it grows the accountability of the 
members of the MPs towards its voters rather than party leaderships.
497
 To further implement a 
decentralized design of candidate selection in KR, stipulating period of residency requirement on 
the candidates would increase the incentives for candidates to be more accountable to their own 
constituencies rather than followers of the party leadership.
498
 One should avoid creating large-
sized constituencies and centralized methods of candidate selection in KR because these have a 
tendency to strengthen the party leadership and to further weaken the will of the Parliament.
499
  
The nomination of candidates for public office is not only an important factor for 
reducing party discipline and leadership’s followers, but it also plays a fundamental role in 
reshaping the formation political parties.
500
 Katz argues “Candidate selection is one of the central 
defining functions of a political party in a democracy.”501  Candidate’s selection within 
“intraparty politics” could substantially have an impact on the ability of the candidates either by 
constraining or empowering the potentiality of the candidates.
502
  Additionally, Kats discuses 
that “whichever extra-parliamentary face were in control in the mass party, selection (and 
potential deselection) of candidates would be one of the devices through which control not only 
of the parliamentary party, but of its leadership and cabinet members as well, would be 
                                                 
496See CEES VAN DER EIJK & MARK FRANKLIN, supra note 481; See also NORTON PHILIP & DAVID MICHAEL WOOD, 
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maintained.”503 Under the mass party, candidate selection method allows central office (an extra-
parliamentary structure) to have considerable impact to influence over elections due to the 
hierarchical structures of the mass party at expense of local branches of the party or different 
political interest groups.
504
   
In KR, to reduce the party discipline, to decrease the power of the party leadership to 
remotely control parliament through mass party structures and PR-relatively closed-list, the 
Kurdistan region draft constitution should adopt PR-STV with small local constituencies which 
enables the local branch of a political party or local constituencies to nominate their candidates 
to the parliament.
505
 PR-STV permits the independent candidates to acquire seats.
506
 PR-STV 
reduces the powers of the leaderships to recruit their patronage network on the local 
constituencies because under PR-STV close evaluations of the candidates by the voters at local 
level minimizes the impact of patronage network which is close to leaderships rather than 
grassroots of political party.
507
 Moreover, recruiting the patronage network would not be as 
mechanical under PR-STV as it is under PR– relatively closed-list. Further, the members of the 
parliament have incentive to be reelected and because the support from constituents matters, they 
must build personal support at local level. With regard to the mass party structures and the 
powers of the leaderships, John Stuart Mill noted that STV allows MPs to have high 
independency from party discipline and party leaderships under Mass party.
508
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In KR, redesign of the general seats of parliament should be based on the PR-STV with 
local constituencies. Under PR-STV, it is worth noting that the proportionality of seats depends 
on the quota and the numbers of seats per constituencies.
509
 Due to the lack of census in KR,
510
 
this analysis refrains itself from specifically allocating the levels of the seats according to each 
governorates and per constituencies. Typically, PR-STV has more proportional and inclusive 
outcomes when the number of the seats per constituencies is “five or more” seats.511 
Nevertheless, the constituencies should not be too large to undermine the localness and adversely 
impact the link between MPs’ and voters. Concerning the women’s quota, a thirty percent 
women’s quota under PR-relatively closed-list should be transformed to thirty percent reserved 
seats of each constituency. For instance, if one constituencies has ten general seats, three of these 
seats should be allocated and reserved to women candidates. Concerning the 11 seats for the 
ethnic minorities, this analysis does not address these seats because it requires a more substantial 
understanding of party discipline and party formations under ethnic minorities political parties.  
Concerning electoral design for disputable areas of article 140 (see chapter one), the 
allocation of seats without census may overrepresent the seats numbers than populations of 
disputable area in Kurdistan Parliament or vice versa. Nevertheless, the STV formula with a 
compulsory ranking vote could minimize the ethnic tension among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen 
because STV incentives these different ethnic to negotiate on the second preference in 
                                                 
509 Nicolaus Tideman, The Single Transferable Vote, 9 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 27, 30 (1995).  
510 See Mustafa Habib, Counting Iraqis: Why There May Never Be A Census Again, NIQASH (20.06.2013), 
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ranking,
512
 or “even the fifth or sixth preference.” 513 It also drives them to do election 
campaigning in different ethnic communities.
514
 For instance, in order to win votes, the Arab 
candidates would seek support from Kurdish communities and vice versa. Also, it is important to 
stipulate in the draft a mechanism for adding extra seats from general seats of KR for disputed 
areas once they have been resolved through article 140. The suitable mechanism is to allow two-
thirds of parliament to decide on the addition of extra seats for disputable areas using a 
“preclearance process” overseen by the constitutional court of KR under draft because the 
power-sharing can be achieved among Kurdish political party by two-third of MPs and the 
preclearance could ensure the integrity of adding extra seats and prevent gerrymandering of 
constituencies.
515
 
3.2 The form of government and constrained parliamentarism model 
 The form of government as discussed above, is a fundamental element in determining the 
capacity of the parliament to provide oversight of the government because the framework of 
accountability within the form of government if it is designed inadequately, allows the flaws and 
wrongdoing of executives to go without punishment.
516
 It also increases the probability those 
misbehaviors could be repeated in the future.
517
  The legislative body in the parliamentary 
system is more influential in holding the government accountable because, in the parliamentary 
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system, the executive branch is the agent of the parliament.
518
 The parliament can hold 
government based on both political accountability and legal transgression of the executive.
519
 
One of the major important aspects of the parliamentary system is that it possesses the 
“immediate” oversight on government’s actions.  Moreover, the parliament enjoys high capacity 
to dismiss politician from offices.
520
 Also, the parliamentary system is more equipped to deal 
with executive’s abuses of powers and wrongdoings.521   
  “[C]onstrained parliamentarism” is a suitable design for KR because it means that the 
parliament is not able to change the law or to amend the law as it wishes but instead is 
constrained by “a written constitution, a bill of rights, and a supreme court.”522  These qualities 
correspond with the issues of flexibility and majoritarian rule because a written constitution 
prevents party leaders from manipulating the autonomy of the parliament for political ends. 
Introducing the bill of rights and Supreme Court enables political and ethnic minorities to protect 
themselves from the majority. Under this model, the head of state should possess ceremonial 
powers. All actions of the President must be signed by the Prime Minister to ensure the prime 
minister is held politically accountable for the actions of President before the parliament.
523
 
Likewise, the president’s actions must be based on the advice of prime minister so that the 
president through the prime minister is responsive to the Parliament.
524
 Therefore, the ceremonial 
power of the President, under constrained parliamentarism, permits the president to have only 
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accountability on “legal transgression” or “constitutional accountability” not be politically 
accountable to Parliament although there are not currently any legal restriction to politically hold 
the president accountable.
525
 
To reduce the impact of the patronizing network on the ministers and MPs, the members 
of the executive should be elected the same as members of the parliament and by the same rules 
of election of the PR-STV with local constituencies. The prime minister and minister should be 
MPs at the same time under same chamber because the ministers and prime ministers are 
encouraged to attend parliament session in order to pass their government agenda or to vote for 
their policies. This will increases political deliberation, questioning, and interrogations between 
government members and parliament members and promotes answerability phase of political 
accountability. In term of incentives, prime minister or ministers could be removed from office 
either by losing elections to their constituencies or dismissing from office by vote no-confidence. 
Seemingly, these risks incentivize the prime minister and ministers to act according to the will of 
its voters and the public generally.
526
 
 At the enforcement phase of political accountability, the executive historically is more 
powerful than parliament in KR. Currently under both the draft and current structure, removing 
government is by two-thirds vote of MPs. Due to two administrations period and power of 
politburo in KR, the executives inherently are more powerful than parliament. It means 
executives- outside of government institutions and constitutional power- can accumulate 
substantial powers through the mass party and patronizing process.  
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also Daniel Lederman et al, supra note 518, at 29. 
 93 
 
Furthermore, parliament seats based on proportional elections always creates coalition 
government. No one political party can receive the majority of seats. Thus, it does not create two 
strong parties to hold each other accountable- one in opposition and another one in the 
government. In the other words, proportionality electoral systems create many political parties 
that cannot have a quick response to prime ministers because most of their actions need many 
negotiations and other time-consuming processes. Even if one believes that majority electoral 
system is suitable for Kurdistan region, the inclusiveness and diversity in Kurdistan region will 
be undercut by a majority electoral system. The trade-off should be by lowering the two-thirds 
no-confidence vote threshold to a majority of MPs. Thus, one can preserve inclusiveness and 
diversity of Kurdistan region in addition to increasing the availability of the enforcement phase 
for enforcing political accountability. 
 Concerning committee design, party discipline, and majoritarian impact on the 
committees of parliament, it is important to reduce the party discipline, patronage process, and 
majority impact on the committee’s oversight and formalizing policies.In KR, the presidium of 
parliament exerts discretionary powers on deciding on the chairmen of committees. Since the 
same majority, an incumbent party, controls the government by virtue of its size, it inhabits 
chairmen of the committees and Presidium of parliament. Because these committees lack of 
separation of purposes- a Madisonian dilemma under federalist no. 10-,
527
 or lack incentive to 
check the government, the curial committees tend to not scrutinize the incumbent party’s actions. 
There are different designs to mitigate issues mentioned above. Allocating chairmanships of 
financial affairs to political oppositions or a minority political party tends to create active 
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oversight of parliament over government spending. This formula exists in the Commonwealth 
Westminster model. Legal committees and other committees should be chair based on a rotation 
among the political parties in the parliament. In Brazil, all committees are chaired based on 
rotation among political parties including political oppositions to reduce the impact of incumbent 
party on the parliament checks.
528
 
Concerning the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC), the solutions of this parallel 
executive should be eliminated as it undermines both political accountability of the parliament 
and government. The KRSC should be an advisory board to “advise and assist” the head of the 
executive.
529
 In a presidential system, the president is also head of the executive. Therefore, the 
National Security Council is under supervisions of the president to formulate policies for 
president. Hence, it should not have any legislating powers that undermine parliament 
accountability to voters. Under the parliamentary formula, the National Security Council is 
advisory board for the prime minister. For instance, National Security Councils in United 
Kingdom, Israel, India and Japan are under the supervision of the prime minister who is 
responsible to Parliament.
530
  
3.3 Overall conclusion 
In KR, the unaccountability of the executive and the powerlessness of the parliament to 
check the executive are discussed under two track of problems. First, the design defects 
including, a form of government, the sovereignty of parliament, the impact of Kurdistan Region 
                                                 
528 G. SHABBIR CHEEMA, BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: GOVERNANCE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
88-89 (2005). 
529 See The Official Website of White House (last visited june.28, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/. 
530 See SUZI NAVOT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 304 (2007); See also JASWANT SINGH, NATIONAL SECURITY: 
AN OUTLINE OF OUR CONCERNS 92-93(1996); See also ANDREW OROS & YUKI TATSUMI, GLOBAL SECURITY 
WATCH—JAPAN 35-36 (2010). 
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Security Council, inadequacy in the mechanism of political accountability at enforcement and 
answerability level. Second contextual factors including, impact of mass party, strong party 
discipline, electoral design, patronizing the parliament, lack of intra-party democracy cedes still 
more power to the executive leaders and those political leaders whom are outside of executive 
and parliament.  
The design defect is mitigated by “constrained-parliamentarism” by stipulating bill of 
right, written constitution, Supreme Court. Additionally, selecting the executive body to MPs 
enhances the interaction between parliament and executive. Also, it provides incentives for 
executives to appear in parliament to collect vote and pass government’s policies. It increases 
debate and political deliberations between executive and parliament which is a missing element 
in KR. By stipulating rotation or fixed-chairmanships of parliament committees for political 
oppositions, the parliament can exert more active checks on executive in oversighting and 
scrutinizing government policies. The parliament can have more influence over the KRSC 
because it would be attached with head of the executive who is prime minister.  
The PR-STV with local constituencies further reduces the power of those leaders inside 
executive or outside of executive to inhabit the parliament seats. By lowering both the no-
confidence vote threshold and party discipline, the parliament can possess more autonomy to 
vote out government.  This strengthens the enforcement phase of political accountability. The 
patronizing members of parliament and mass party structures would be reduced because they are 
accountable to their local constituency. The MPs are more prone to fulfill the voter’s demands 
rather the leadership in order to preserve their seats in parliament. Moreover, the minister and 
prime minister, to ensure their positions, have to participate in elections and face electors rather 
than being mechanically appointed as they are under the current structures and draft constitution. 
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Thus, it increases interaction between the executive and voters- which increases vertical 
accountability.  
By weakening the extra-parliamentary structures of political parties through PR-STV, the 
leadership’s apparatus at their hand would be weakened. The parliament structures would be the 
center of political deliberations. Intra-party democracy would be increased due to the pressures 
of local consistencies. Cohesiveness tends to be the way of functions in the parliamentary 
factions. The leaderships encouraged to use more parliamentary techniques to promote the unity. 
Likewise, the leadership is encouraged to attract approval from their members in order to be 
build loyalty and cohesiveness.  The members of the parliament are encouraged to raise critical 
issues over their leaderships in the executive-horizontal accountability. Also, the newcomers and 
independent candidates would be encouraged to be elected thus helping to protect minority rights 
and undermining large party hegemony. 
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